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ABSTRACT 
 
Burden of the Cold War: The George H.W. Bush Administration and El Salvador. 
(December 2010) 
Sebastian Rene Arandia, B.A., Texas Tech University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Andrew J. Kirkendall 
 
At the start of the George H.W. Bush administration, American involvement in 
El Salvador‘s civil war, one of the last Cold War battlegrounds, had disappeared from 
the foreign policy agenda. However, two events in November 1989 shattered the 
bipartisan consensus on US policy toward El Salvador: the failure of the FMLN‘s largest 
military offensive of the war and the murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and 
her daughter by the Salvadoran military, the FAES. Despite more than one billion dollars 
in US military assistance, the war had stalemated, promoting both sides to seek a 
negotiated political settlement mediated by the United Nations. The Jesuit murders 
demonstrated the failure of the policy of promoting respect for democracy and human 
rights and revived the debate in Congress over US aid to El Salvador. 
This thesis argues that the Bush administration sought to remove the burden of El 
Salvador from its foreign policy agenda by actively pushing for the investigation and 
prosecution of the Jesuit case and fully supporting the UN-mediated peace process. 
Using recently declassified government documents from the George Bush Presidential 
Library, this thesis will examine how the Bush administration fundamentally changed 
iv 
 
US policy toward El Salvador. Administration officials carried out an unprecedented 
campaign to pressure the FAES to investigate the Jesuit murders and bring the killers to 
justice while simultaneously attempting to prevent Congress from cutting American 
military assistance. The Bush administration changed the objective of its El Salvador 
policy from military victory over the guerrillas to a negotiated political settlement. The 
US facilitated the peace process by pressuring the Salvadoran government and the 
FMLN to negotiate in good faith and accept compromises. When both sides signed a 
comprehensive peace agreement on January 16, 1992, the burden of El Salvador was 
lifted.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era transformed the 
international system. The United States emerged victorious from the Cold War as its 
former communist adversaries dissolved and proxy conflicts in the Third World ended. 
Historians and political scientists have analyzed how the George H. W. Bush 
administration handled the key events of the post-Cold War era: the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the Persian Gulf War.
1
 However, 
scholars of this period in American foreign policy have ignored the end of the Cold War 
in Latin America. The literature on the Bush administration‘s Latin America policy 
focuses overwhelmingly on the Panama crisis and the subsequent invasion in December 
1989.
2
  One subject that is lacking in this scholarship is El Salvador. This thesis will 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of Diplomatic History.  
 
1
 On all three subjects, see James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace,  
1989-1992, with Thomas M. DeFrank (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995); George Bush and Brent  
Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998); William C. Wohlforth, ed., Cold War  
Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2003). On the collapse of the Soviet Union, see Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the  
Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993); Melvyn P.  
Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill  
and Wang, 2007). On the reunification of Germany, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany  
Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  
1995); Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 2009). On the Persian Gulf War, see Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New  
York : Simon & Schuster, 1991); Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 :  
Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Gary R.  
Hess, Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq 2nd ed. (Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
2
 On the Bush administration‘s Panama policy, see Bob Woodward, The Commanders; Guillermo de St.  
Malo Arias and Godfrey Harris, The Panamanian Problem: How the Reagan and Bush Administrations  
Dealt with the Noriega Regime (Los Angeles: Americas Group, 1993); Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and  
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examine how the end of the Cold War shaped the evolution of the Bush administration‘s 
El Salvador policy.  
The Central American nation of El Salvador was one of the last Cold War 
battlegrounds. El Salvador descended into civil war in 1980 between the Salvadoran 
government and Marxist-Leninist insurgents known as the Frente Farabundo Martí de 
Liberacion Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front or FMLN). The Jimmy 
Carter administration sought to prevent a leftist revolution by providing economic and 
military assistance to the Salvadoran government. The Ronald Reagan administration 
escalated American involvement in the Salvadoran civil war. A FMLN victory, the 
administration contended, would lead to communist domination of Central America and 
shift the global balance of power to the Soviet Union. Opponents of Reagan‘s policy in 
Congress, however, argued that the US was supporting a government and military with 
terrible human rights records and feared that El Salvador would become ―another 
Vietnam.‖ From 1981 to 1984, they sought to condition and cut the administration‘s 
requests for economic and military aid to El Salvador. Both sides agreed in 1984 to a 
bipartisan consensus policy based on democracy, human rights promotion, and El 
Salvador‘s security from leftist and rightist extremists. By 1989, El Salvador had 
received over $4 billion in US economic and military aid.  
In 1989, the George Bush administration ignored El Salvador and focused on 
events in Europe, most importantly, relations with the Soviet Union and the collapse of 
                                                                                                                                                
Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War (Lawrence: University Press of  
Kansas, 2008).  For an overview of the Bush administration‘s Latin America policy, see Meena  
Bose and Rosanna Perotti, eds. From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George Bush 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), part IV.  
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communism. Two dates are crucial to understanding why El Salvador reemerged on the 
Bush administration‘s foreign policy agenda: November 11 and 16, 1989. On November 
11, the FMLN launched its largest military offensive of the war. Although the offensive 
failed to achieve its objective of overthrowing the government, both the Salvadoran 
government and FMLN recognized that the war had stalemated and that only a 
negotiated political settlement mediated by the United Nations would end it. On 
November 16, the Salvadoran military murdered six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, 
and her daughter and covered up the crime by blaming the guerillas. The Jesuit murders 
demonstrated the failure of US policy of promoting respect for democracy and human 
rights and renewed the debate in Congress over US aid to El Salvador.  
The literature on US policy toward El Salvador focuses overwhelmingly on the 
Carter and Reagan administrations, specifically, the years from 1979 to 1984. This 
literature can be organized into three categories: the battles between the Reagan 
administration and Congress, democracy and human rights promotion, and the US 
military advisory effort.
3
 The majority of scholars and former diplomats who have 
                                                 
3
 The best work on the debate in Congress over US policy toward Central America is Cynthia J. Arnson,  
Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993, 2nd
 
ed. (University Park:  
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). See also, William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The  
United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,  
1998), Shaw Sullivan, ―The Reagan Administration and El Salvador, 1981-84: Bureaucratic and Domestic  
Politics Revisited.‖ Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 8 no.2 (Summer 1999): 33-57. On  
democracy and human rights promotion, see Thomas Carothers,  In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy  
Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Mark  
Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999);  
Elizabeth J. Harris, ―Minions or Mavericks? United States Ambassadors and Human Rights Policy in El  
Salvador‖ (Master‘s thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 2000). On the US military advisory effort, see  
A.J. Bacevich and others, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador: Special  
Report, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey‘s International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988);  
Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of  
Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991; Michael  
Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development: The Cases of  
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written about the Bush administration‘s policy toward El Salvador agree that the events 
of November 1989 led to a change in the policy and the end of the Salvadoran civil war. 
However, few examine the Bush administration‘s El Salvador policy comprehensively. 
Political scientist William M. LeoGrande focuses on the debate in Congress over US aid 
and the peace process but ignores the Bush administration‘s private campaign to 
pressure the Salvadoran government and military to resolve the Jesuit case.
4
 In his book 
on the Bush administration‘s foreign policy, political scientist Steven Hurst also 
marginalizes the administration‘s role in the investigation and prosecution of the Jesuit 
murders and in the peace process.
5
 Hurst argues that ―the Bush administration‘s 
inattention and tardiness in responding to change in the Third World led to policies that 
were reactive, frequently ill thought through and at the mercy of congressional critics.‖6    
The most comprehensive studies of the Jesuit murders were written by human 
rights organizations or scholars who had a personal connection to the murdered Jesuits.
7
 
Martha Doggett criticizes the Bush administration‘s handling of witnesses and 
investigative leads but does not discuss the pressure applied by the administration on its 
                                                                                                                                                
El Salvador and Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995); Richard Duncan Downie,  
Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War (Westport: Praeger,  
1998); John D. Waghelstein ―Military-to-Military Contacts: Personal Observations – The El Salvador  
Case.‖ Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 10 no. 2 (Summer 2001): 1-45; Kalev Sepp, ―The  
Evolution of United States Military Strategy in Central America, 1979-1991,‖ (PhD diss., Harvard  
University, 2002).   
4
 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, ch. 23 
5
 Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order (London: 
Cassell, 1999), 135-137.  
6
 Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration, 143.  
7
 Martha Doggett, Death Foretold: The Jesuit Murders in El Salvador (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1993); Teresa Whitfield, a and the Murdered Jesuits 
of El Salvador. Ignacio W. Ochoa, ―El Salvador 1989: The Two Jesuit Standards and the Final Offensive,‖ 
(Master‘s thesis, San Diego State University, 2003).  
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ally. Using declassified US government documents, Teresa Whitfield presents an almost 
impartial analysis of the administration‘s efforts to bring the killers to justice. The 
literature on the Salvadoran peace process is more extensive than the previous two 
subjects.
8
 However, few scholars and participants have examined the peace process from 
the perspective of the Bush administration. Relying on US government records and 
recent interviews with US officials, Diana Villiers Negroponte has the most detailed 
account of the administration‘s involvement in the peace process. She argues that the 
administration was one of the key actors that facilitated the end of the civil war.  
This thesis is one of the first scholarly works to use primary source documents 
regarding the Bush administration‘s El Salvador policy from the George Bush 
Presidential Library. These documents reveal previously unknown discussions about the 
Jesuit murders, the debate in Congress, and the peace process and contribute to a more 
balanced account of the El Salvador policy that builds upon previous scholarship. In 
addition, this thesis also utilized two electronic databases: two collections of US 
government documents related to El Salvador from the Digital National Security 
                                                 
8
 See Joseph G. Sullivan, ―How Peace Came to El Salvador.‖ Orbis 38 no.1 (Winter 1994): 83-98; The  
United Nations and El Salvador, 1990-1995, The United Nations Blue Book Series, vol. 4 (New York:  
United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995); Pilgrimage for Peace:  
A Secretary-General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1997); Tricia Juhn, Negotiating Peace in  
El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations and the Conspiracy to End the War (London: Macmillan, 1998);  
Alvaro De Soto, ―Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador‖ in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a  
Complex World, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.:  
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 349-385; Diego Arria, ―Bringing Leverage to the Peace  
Process in El Salvador and Central America,‖ in Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace  
Operations, eds. Jean E Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes, and Donald C.F. Daniel (Westport: Praeger,  
2003), 55-80; Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003);  
Diana Villiers Negroponte, ―Conflict Resolution at the End of the Cold War: The Case of El  
Salvador, 1989-1994‖ (PhD diss. Georgetown University, 2006); Teresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed?: The  
United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States  
Institute of Peace Press, 2007).   
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Archive and the El Salvador Collection available at the US Department of State Freedom 
of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.  
What follows is an examination of how the events of November 1989 facilitated 
the transition from a Cold War to a post-Cold War policy toward El Salvador. Chapter II 
discusses US-Salvadoran relations from 1961 to 1989 in a Cold War context and the 
evolution of democracy, human rights, and military policies toward El Salvador. This 
chapter also discusses the battles between executive and legislative branches of the US 
government over American economic and military assistance. Chapter III focuses on 
how the administration pressured the Salvadoran government and military to investigate 
the Jesuit murders and prosecute those responsible while simultaneously attempting to 
prevent Congress from cutting aid to El Salvador. Chapter IV examines the role of the 
Bush administration in the UN-mediated peace process. This thesis argues that the Bush 
administration removed the burden of El Salvador from its foreign policy agenda by 
actively pressing the Salvadoran government and military for the resolution of the Jesuit 
case and fully supporting the UN-mediated peace process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
CHAPTER II 
―THE ISRAEL OF CENTRAL AMERICA‖: THE UNITED STATES AND EL 
SALVADOR, 1979-1989 
 
Unlike most of Central America, the United States had little economic, military, 
and political influence in El Salvador in the early twentieth century.
9
  El Salvador did 
not experience a ―banana war‖ between 1898 and 1934, the period of US economic and 
military interventionism in the region.
10
 To understand how El Salvador became what 
New York Times correspondent James LeMoyne called in February 1989, ―the Israel of 
Central America-a country no American President can afford not to support,‖11 it is 
necessary to start with the establishment of the military dictatorship. Military rule began 
when la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador (El Salvador Armed Forces or FAES) under 
General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez overthrew civilian reformist president Arturo 
Araujo in December 1931.
12
 Outraged at the military‘s consolidation of power, the 
Partido Comunista de El Salvador (Communist Party of El Salvador or PCES) launched 
a three-day peasant revolt against the dictatorship in January 1932. In response, the 
FAES in cooperation with oligarchs killed as many as 30,000 peasants and workers 
                                                 
9
 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed. (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 1993), ch.1. 
10For more information on the ―banana wars,‖ see Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States 
intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934, rev. ed. (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002). 
11
 James LeMoyne, ―Guns of Salvador,‖ The New York Times, February 5, 1989.  
12
 Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace, 2nd ed.  
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 35. All US government documents on policy toward El Salvador use the  
English abbreviation, ESAF, when discussing the FAES. When referring to the Salvadoran government,  
these documents use the abbreviation Government of El Salvador, GOES.  
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including the PCES‘ leader, Augustín Farabundo Martí.13 This event is known in 
Salvadoran history as La Matanza (The Massacre).
14
 
Between 1932 and 1979, a military-oligarchy alliance governed El Salvador. 
Political scientist William Stanley argues that military rule transformed El Salvador into 
―essentially a protection racket state: the military earned the concession to govern the 
country (and pillage the state) in exchange for its willingness to use violence against 
class enemies of the country‘s relatively small but powerful economic elite.‖15 Every 
president during this period was a FAES officer who protected the interests of the 
―Fourteen Families‖ who controlled El Salvador‘s economy. The FAES consisted of 
military forces (the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force) and public security forces (the 
National Guard, the National Police, the Treasury Police, and the Territorial Service).
16
 
The FAES was governed by the High Command, a group consisting of the minister and 
deputy minister of defense, the chief and deputy chief of the Estado Mayor General de 
la Fuerza Armada (Armed Forces General Staff), the commanders of the Air Force and 
several Army brigades, and the directors of the public security forces.
17
  
                                                 
13
Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, 36-37. 
14
See Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza: El Salvador’s Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln
- - Remembering a 
Massacre in El Salvador: The Insurrection of 1932, Roque Dalton, and the Politics of Historical Memory 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007); Jeffrey L. Gould and Aldo A. Lauria-Santiago, To 
Rise in Darkness: Revolution, Repression, and Memory in El Salvador, 1920-1932 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008).  
15
 William Deane Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in  
El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 6-7. 
16
 The public security forces maintained order and stability in rural and urban areas. Brian J. Bosch, The 
Salvadoran Officer Corps and the Final Offensive of 1981 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1999), 19. 
17
 Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter, Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador's Transition to  
Democracy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 104. 
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The 1959 Cuban Revolution fundamentally changed US policy toward Latin 
America. Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro‘s commitment to spreading 
communist revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere transformed Latin America 
into a critical Cold War battleground. To combat communist aggression and subversion, 
President John F. Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress on March 13, 1961. This 
policy of massive economic and social assistance programs was based, according to 
historian Stephen G. Rabe, on ―the belief that the key to stability and anticommunism 
was democracy, economic growth and development, and social change.‖18 Influenced by 
modernization theory, the Kennedy administration viewed progressive, modern, 
democratic governments and societies as the key to winning the Cold War in Latin 
America.
19
  
The Alliance for Progress strengthened US-Salvadoran relations. Although El 
Salvador faced no internal security threats during the 1960s, it received more Alliance 
for Progress funds than any other Central American nation.
20
 The Alliance for Progress 
resulted in increased foreign investment, high economic growth rates, and the creation of 
new industries. The Lyndon Johnson administration upheld El Salvador as a model 
                                                 
18
 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist 
Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 196. On Alliance for 
Progress, see also Michael D. Gambone, Capturing the Revolution: The United States, Central America, 
and Nicaragua, 1961-1972 (Westport: Praeger, 2001); Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: 
The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007).  
19
 For a history of modernization theory, see Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American 
Social Science and "Nation Building"in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000).  
20
 El Salvador received a yearly average of $14.36 million in Alliance for Progress funds from 1962 to 
1967. K. Larry Storrs, El Salvador Highlights, 1960 - 1990: A Summary of Major Turning Points in 
Salvadoran History and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, March 13, 1990, 1.  
10 
 
country for the policy.
21
 However, the Alliance for Progress inadvertently contributed to 
the wealth and power of oligarchs who manipulated the funding to their advantage. The 
military dictatorship implemented no major economic or social reforms to address issues 
such as malnourishment or land inequality.
22
 Furthermore, the 1969 ―Soccer War‖ with 
Honduras worsened peasant life by displacing hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans. By 
1970, the Alliance for Progress had failed to achieve its objective of a moderate 
democratic government in El Salvador.  
US military policy toward Latin America shifted from hemispheric defense 
against external threats toward internal security and counterinsurgency.
23
 Starting in 
1961, the US focused on advising and equipping Latin American armed forces to defeat 
leftist rural and urban insurgencies and promote the goals of the Alliance for Progress. 
The Kennedy administration viewed Latin American militaries as a force for social and 
economic reform.
24
   
US military advisors and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained the 
FAES in civic action and counterinsurgency and helped established a new security 
apparatus. A paramilitary force, Organización Democrática Nacionalista (National 
Democratic Organization or ORDEN), was created to gather intelligence on communist 
subversives in rural areas. By 1979, ORDEN had over 100,000 members. ORDEN 
                                                 
21
 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 175. 
22
 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 176-177. 
23
 On US military assistance to Latin America, see Willard Foster Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal 
Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 1966); Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 
Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2006).   
24
 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 128.    
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operated under the new intelligence organization, Agencia Nacional de Seguridad 
Salvadoreña (Salvadoran National Security Agency or ANSEAL). Alleged subversives 
were targeted and killed by ORDEN, ANSEAL elite units, the National Guard and 
starting in the 1970s, by escuadrones de la muerte (death squads) composed of 
plainclothes military and police personnel.
25
 The security apparatus established under the 
Alliance for Progress increased the effectiveness of state repression in El Salvador.  
El Salvador faced a revolutionary crisis during the 1970s. The expansion of the 
export-crop economy increased the concentration of land ownership, landlessness, and 
unequal income distribution.
26
 A coalition of three center-left political parties led by the 
social democratic, anticommunist political party, Partido Demócrata Cristiano 
(Christian Democratic Party or PDC) challenged the dictatorship through the electoral 
process. The coalition‘s candidate, José Napoleón Duarte of the PDC, won the 1972 
presidential election but the military overturned the results.
27
 Duarte was exiled to 
Venezuela and did not return to El Salvador until 1979. The election convinced many 
Salvadorans that only revolution could end the protection racket state. Five political-
military organizations, composed of mostly peasants and influenced by Marxism-
Leninism and Catholic liberation theology, emerged to challenge the dictatorship.
28
 
                                                 
25
 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, 54-56. 
26
 Hugh Byrne, El Salvador’s Civil War: A Study of Revolution (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1996), 18-22. 
27
 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, 62-64 
28
 The five guerrilla groups are the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (the Popular Forces of Liberation or 
FPL), Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (the People's Revolutionary Army or ERP), Fuerzas Armadas 
de Resistencia Nacional (the Armed Forces of National Resistance or FARN), the Revolutionary Party of 
Central American Workers (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos or PRTC), and 
the Partido Comunista de El Salvador (Communist Party of El Salvador or PCES). Byrne, El Salvador’s 
Civil War, 33-42. 
12 
 
These guerrilla groups focused on overthrowing the government through armed struggle, 
by creating mass popular organizations, and organizing peasants and workers. Non-
violent leftist groups composed of activist clergymen, students, and peasants were also 
organized to protest the dictatorship. The situation in El Salvador deteriorated further 
with the fraudulent victory of General Carlos Humberto Romero in the 1977 presidential 
election. Romero escalated state violence against members of the Catholic Church and 
the guerrilla organizations. The guerrillas responded with kidnappings of Salvadoran and 
foreign businessmen, assassinations, and bombings.
29
   
The Catholic Church faced a wave of repression in the late 1970s. The Society of 
Jesus at the campus of the Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas" (José 
Simeón Cañas Central American University or UCA) in San Salvador spoke out against 
the dictatorship on behalf of poor peasants and the oppressed. As a result, according to 
scholar Teresa Whitfield, the university was targeted by rightwing groups, the 
Salvadoran military, and the press as ―a hotbed of Marxist ideas where the minds of the 
Salvadoran youth were ‗poisoned‘ and guerrilla operations plotted.‖30 Fliers circulated 
with the message ―Be a Patriot! Kill a Priest!‖ The first priest to be killed during the 
revolutionary crisis was Salvadoran Jesuit Rutilio Grande who was shot on March 12, 
1977. The next month, Father Alfonso Navarro was killed.
31
 Other priests were exiled, 
expelled, tortured, and arrested.  
                                                 
29
 Byrne, El Salvador’s Civil War, 44-46. 
30
 Whitfield, Paying the Price, 4. 
31
 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, 84-93. 
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The Jimmy Carter administration made the promotion and defense of human 
rights a fundamental tenet of its foreign policy. According to historians David F. 
Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, Carter‘s commitment to human rights and a foreign policy 
based on moral values represented a break from the previous thirty years of American 
foreign policy that focused on the containment of the Soviet Union.
32
 The issue of 
human rights weakened ties between the Carter administration and El Salvador. In early 
1977, President Romero renounced all US aid when the Department of State criticized El 
Salvador‘s human rights record and announced that aid would be cut to countries with 
patterns of human rights violations.
33
  
The integration of human rights into US foreign policy has its origins in the 
Congressional hearings and human rights legislation of the early 1970s. Starting in 1973, 
the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements chaired by 
Democratic Representative Donald Fraser held hearings on human rights violations 
committed by right-wing authoritarian regimes that received US economic and military 
aid such as Chile.
34
 The subcommittee‘s key recommendations for human rights 
legislation outlined in the March 1974 report Human Rights in the World Community: A 
                                                 
32
 David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, ―Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The  
Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,‖ Diplomatic History 28 no.1 (January 2004):119-120.  
On the Carter administration‘s human rights policy, see Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States  
Policy toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Gaddis Smith, Morality,  
Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Victor  
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Call for U.S. Leadership were passed by Congress in 1975 and 1976. Congress 
prohibited security and economic assistance to countries that violated human rights and 
established the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and the position of 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the 
Department of State.
35
  
Since 1976, the US has implemented its bilateral human rights policy through 
initiatives such as private diplomatic discussions, human rights training for security 
forces, sanctions, and military intervention.
36
 However, political scientist Kathryn 
Sikkink argues that a bilateral human rights policy ―did not mean that human rights took 
precedence in foreign policy decisions. It simply meant that diplomatic staff accepted 
that human rights issues were now part of the policy calculus…Human rights concerns 
frequently lost out to…competing perceptions of national security interests…and the 
preservation of smooth bilateral relations.‖37 The prioritization of human rights and 
national security interests would become the most important dilemma of US policy 
toward El Salvador across three administrations.  
The year 1979 was marked by a series of setbacks for American global power. 
From the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 to 1979, the Soviet Union‘s intervention in 
Third World conflicts undermined détente and contributed to the deterioration of 
superpower relations. In addition to the crises in Central America, 1979 saw the fall of 
the US-backed Shah of Iran in February, the seizure of the US Embassy and 52 hostages 
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in Tehran in November, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December.
38
 The 
mishandling of these crises contributed to the perception that the Carter administration 
was weak on national security.
39
 US-Soviet relations reached a breaking point with the 
invasion of Afghanistan. By January 1980, according to historian Melvyn P. Leffler, 
détente was dead and the Cold War had been resurrected.
40
  
The Nicaraguan Revolution was the catalyst for the overthrow of President 
Romero. On July 19, 1979, the Marxist-Leninist Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front or FSLN) overthrew the Somoza family 
dynasty that had ruled Nicaragua since 1937.
41
 The FSLN was the second successful 
Latin American revolutionary movement of the Cold War. The Salvadoran officer corps 
and Carter administration officials feared that a similar revolution could occur in El 
Salvador.
42
 A group of young reformist officers and civilians forced Romero to leave El 
Salvador in a bloodless coup on October 15, 1979. The dictatorship was replaced with a 
five-person civilian-military junta known as the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno 
(Revolutionary Government Junta, or JRG).
43
 From 1979 to 1982, four juntas governed 
El Salvador. The juntas implemented numerous reforms including a three-phase agrarian 
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reform plan, nationalizing the banks, and abolishing ANSEAL, but also declared a state 
of siege in March 1980.
44
 Social democratic and leftist political groups joined in April 
1980 to form the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (Democratic Revolutionary Front 
or FDR). This center-left to left coalition carried out general strikes in June and August 
that shut down the country.
45
  
The Cold War transformed El Salvador into ―the Israel of Central America.‖ The 
Carter administration paid little attention to El Salvador until 1979 when the Nicaraguan 
Revolution triggered fears of communist domination of Central America.
46
 Although the 
Sandinistas had limited support from Cuba and none from the Soviet Union, Carter‘s 
officials feared Nicaragua would become ―another Cuba‖ and export communist 
revolution across the region.
47
 Despite these fears, the Carter administration provided 
material support to the Sandinistas‘ literacy campaign in 1980.48 
Following the October 1979 coup, the Carter administration supported the juntas 
in order to prevent another leftist revolution, ―another Nicaragua.‖ Todd Greentree, a 
former Foreign Service Officer who served in El Salvador during the 1980s, outlined the 
Carter administration‘s El Salvador policy: ―… supporting reforms that would reduce the 
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appeal of the left and build the government to reign in the security forces, fending off 
coup attempts from the right, and building the political center by isolating radicals on 
both extremes. These goals amounted to nothing less revolutionary than transforming El 
Salvador itself.‖49 Like the Kennedy and Johnson administration‘s goals under the 
Alliance for Progress, the Carter administration sought to establish a centrist government 
by supporting democracy, economic growth, and reforms in El Salvador.  
The extreme right unleashed a terror upon El Salvador that exceeded La 
Matanza. According to political scientist Hugh Byrne, exiled Salvadoran oligarchs in 
Guatemala and Miami, Florida, allied with right-wing military officers to carry out ―a 
‗dirty war‘ against all those suspected of supporting the left and moving to regain power 
by attempting military coups against the civilian-military juntas.‖50 Death squads, led by 
former National Guard Major Roberto D‘Aubuisson, seized, interrogated, tortured, and 
killed thousands of Salvadorans with impunity.
51
 D‘Aubuisson used his experience and 
contacts in ORDEN and ANSEAL to organize death squads such as the Ejército Secreto 
Anticomunista (Secret Anticommunist Army) and the Brigada Maximiliano Hernández 
Martínez (Maximiliano Hernández Martínez Brigade).
52
 According to the human rights 
organization Americas Watch, the FAES and death squads targeted the labor force, 
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Catholic Church officials and religious workers, political parties, the media, students, 
teachers, humanitarians, and human rights monitors.
53
  
Right-wing assassins murdered Archbishop of San Salvador Oscar Romero, an 
ardent critic of the military, on March 24, 1980 while he celebrated mass. Romero‘s 
death and the massacre during his funeral procession on March 30 prompted 
international condemnation of the violence in El Salvador. When D‘Aubuisson was 
arrested in May 1980 for plotting a coup, documents were seized linking him to 
Romero‘s assassination.54 D‘Aubuisson was released days later but a 1993 United 
Nations human rights report declared that ―[he] gave the order to assassinate the 
Archbishop and gave precise instruction to members of his security service, acting as a 
‗death squad,‘ to organize and supervise the assassination.‖55 The armed forces and 
death squads were responsible for the overwhelming majority of the estimated 9,000 to 
15,000 Salvadorans killed in 1980.
56
  
The JRG faced a growing leftist insurgency in 1980.  In October 1980, the five 
guerrilla organizations joined to form the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberacion 
Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front or FMLN) in honor of Augustín 
Farabundo Martí.
57
 The FDR allied with the FMLN to form a revolutionary coalition. 
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The five factions agreed to unification as a condition for Cuban and Nicaraguan military 
aid and training.
58
 During 1980, the FMLN received weapons, training, and money from 
Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and other communist countries.
59
  
National security interests ultimately took precedence over human rights when 
the Carter administration resumed military aid to preserve and reform the FAES as an 
institution.
60
 In February 1980, the US began providing non-lethal military aid and 
training to leverage the FAES to reduce human rights violations and end death squad 
activities.
61
 Human rights violations dramatically increased in 1980 as the FAES 
systematically repressed the political left, mass organizations and the five guerrilla 
groups. According to historian John A. Soares Jr., the Carter administration was aware 
of the FAES‘ terrible human rights record but asserted that ―[h]uman rights would be 
served in the long run by dealing with the immediate strategic challenge posed by the 
growing strength of revolutionary movements in Central America.‖62 On February 17, 
Archbishop Romero wrote a letter to Carter arguing that US military aid would increase 
state repression. The administration made a concerted effort to convince Archbishop 
Romero to support the JRG in the weeks before his assassination, even contacting Pope 
John Paul II to pressure him.
63
 US Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White, one of the 
State Department‘s strongest advocates for human rights, supported the $5.7 million in 
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non-lethal military assistance but opposed the Department of Defense‘s proposal for the 
deployment of US military advisors. He did not want the advisors to associate with 
extreme rightists in the FAES. However, he did allow US military personnel to train 300 
Salvadoran officers in human rights in Panama.
64
 
El Salvador drew further international outrage with the rape and murder of three 
American nuns and a Catholic layworker by National Guardsmen on December 2, 
1980.
65
 After the murder of the four American churchwomen in December 1980, Carter 
suspended US aid to El Salvador and sent a presidential task force to investigate the 
murders. When the task force did not find evidence linking senior junta officials to the 
murders, Carter restored economic aid on December 12.
66
 The next month, National 
Guardsmen shot and killed two American advisors from the American Institute for Free 
Labor Development (AIFLD) and their Salvadoran colleague at the Sheraton Hotel in 
the capital, San Salvador.  
After months of preparation, the FMLN launched the ―Final Offensive‖ to 
overthrow the JRG on January 10, 1981 throughout El Salvador. The political-military 
strategy consisted of a nationwide military offensive with a simultaneous national strike 
and defections from the FAES to the FMLN.
67
 In response, Carter, in one of his last acts 
as President, announced $5 million in lethal military aid, the first since 1977, to El 
Salvador on January 14, 1981. By the end of the month, the offensive was a military and 
political failure. The FMLN made several crucial mistakes, most importantly, 
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underestimating the strength and unity of the Salvadoran officer corps.
68
 Political 
scientist William M. LeoGrande contends that the Carter administration failed to prevent 
the civil war because it relied on a reformist political center that was too weak to 
confront the extreme left and extreme right.
69
  
The Ronald Reagan administration implemented a hard-line El Salvador policy. 
From 1977 to 1980, Reagan, the Republican right, and neoconservatives criticized the 
Carter administration for its emphasis on promoting human rights and not combating 
alleged Cuban and Soviet aggression in the Western Hemisphere.
70
 Republicans argued 
that Carter‘s mishandling of the crises of 1979 and the renewed Cold War left US 
national security vulnerable to Soviet expansionism in the Third World. Once in power, 
anti-communist hard-liners reoriented the El Salvador policy toward a military solution 
that abandoned human rights promotion. On March 2, 1981, the administration provided 
$25 million in military aid to El Salvador, $20 million of which were approved without 
congressional approval, and increased the number of US advisors to 55.
71
  
The Reagan administration argued that El Salvador was a vital US national 
security issue. Reagan‘s first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, focused the 
administration‘s attention to El Salvador in January 1981, according to LeoGrande, 
because it appeared ―politically defensible, military winnable…geostrategically 
advantageous… [and it] seemed like an ideal place for a showdown [with the Soviet 
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Union].‖72  According to political scientist Lars Schoultz, Central America became a 
―symbol of U.S. power and resolve. Day after day, week after week, the Reagan 
administration said that Central America is the place where the United States had to stop 
Communism from swallowing up U.S. allies.‖73 A FMLN victory, administration 
officials emphasized, would undermine the credibility of the US and shift the global 
balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union.
74
  
The domino theory also influenced the Reagan policy toward Central America.
75
 
The Reagan administration emphasized that the FSLN and FMLN were manifestations 
of Soviet and Cuban aggression in Central America. Nicaragua was the first ―domino‖ to 
―fall‖ in Central America to communist expansionism and El Salvador was next. The 
domino theory, political scientist Jerome Slater asserts, exaggerated the role of external 
aggression in Central America, the relationship between revolutionaries in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, limited US policy options to covert action or military intervention, and 
overestimated the threats to US national security.
76
 Opponents of Reagan‘s El Salvador 
policy contended that the global balance of power argument and domino theory had been 
used to justify the Vietnam War.
77
 The administration was aware of the pervasive fear of 
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escalated US involvement in the Salvadoran civil war but according to LeoGrande, when 
it ―insisted that El Salvador would not become another Vietnam, more people who had 
never heard of El Salvador began to worry that it would.‖78  
 The Soviet Union did not intervene in the Salvadoran civil war. Scholar Danuta 
Paszyn argues that ―contrary to the Reagan administration‘s propaganda, the Soviet 
Union, even in the pre-Gorbachev period, paid only lip service to the Salvadoran 
revolutionary struggle.‖79 Central American analysts in the Soviet Union recognized that 
conditions existed for armed struggle in El Salvador but the FMLN lacked the necessary 
unity to overthrow the government.
80
 As a result, the Soviet Union did not provide the 
FMLN with military aid and training. Furthermore, the relationship between the FMLN 
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was marginal and most of the five factions 
were anti-Soviet.
81
  
The other component of the Reagan administration‘s Central America policy was 
the rollback of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The US cooperated with 
Argentine military government in the early 1980s to organize and train anti-Sandinistas 
forces known as Contrarevolucionarios (Counterrevolutionaries or Contras).
82
 Publicly, 
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the Contras were an interdiction force that would stop arms shipments from Nicaragua to 
the FMLN. Secretly, their objective was to overthrow the Sandinistas. The Reagan 
administration faced strong Congressional opposition to its requests for humanitarian 
and military aid to the Contras in 1982 and 1983. Congress passed a $24 million cap on 
funding for the Contras in December 1983. When the funds ran out in the spring of 
1984, the CIA was expected to end its support for the Contras. However, the Reagan 
administration established an illegal system to circumvent Congress and continue 
funding the Contras from 1984 to 1986. The operation was made public in October 1986 
and followed by the revelation that the administration had sold arms to Iran to secure the 
release of hostages in Lebanon and diverted the money from the arms sales to funding 
the Contras.  The Iran-Contra scandal nearly led to the demise of the Reagan 
administration.
83
  
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan‘s Ambassador to the United Nations, shaped the 
administration‘s human rights policy toward El Salvador. Kirkpatrick had argued in an 
influential 1979 Commentary article that the US should support anticommunist 
authoritarian regimes with poor human rights records because unlike revolutionary 
communist regimes, they could transform themselves through progressive liberalization 
and democratization.
84
 Carter‘s human rights policy, she asserted, had alienated 
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authoritarian regimes friendly to the US, most notably, Iran and Nicaragua, and 
contributed to their downfall. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration, guided by 
what Sikkink called the ―Kirkpatrick Doctrine,‖ ignored human rights violations and 
reestablished relations with Latin American military governments.
85
   
The Reagan administration made little effort to pressure the Salvadoran 
government and FAES to reduce human rights violations. According to Thomas 
Carothers, who served in the State Department‘s Office of the Legal Adviser during the 
1980s, administration hard-liners blamed the FMLN for much of the political violence 
and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, argued that the FAES had no 
connection to the right-wing death squads. Furthermore, they argued that burdening the 
FAES with human rights concerns undermined its war-fighting capabilities.
86
  
In response to widespread opposition to its El Salvador policy from Congress, the 
American press and public, the administration publicly shifted from a hard-line 
anticommunist policy to a democracy promotion policy in July 1981.
87
 Democracy and 
free elections became the administration‘s political solution to ending the civil war.88  
The administration revived the Carter policy of supporting a centrist democratic 
government in El Salvador. The Duarte-led PDC received millions of dollars for the 
March 1982 elections for Constituent Assembly which would choose a provisional 
                                                 
85
Sikkink, Mixed Signals, 148-155.   
86
 Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 23-24. 
87
 Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1999), 121. 
88
 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 127. 
26 
 
president and draft a new constitution.
89
 The elections would demonstrate to Congress 
the legitimacy of the Salvadoran government and its transition to civilian rule.
90
  
A PDC victory was jeopardized in 1981 when D‘Aubuisson founded the rightist, 
anticommunist political party Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican 
Alliance or ARENA).
91
 According to scholar Richard A. Haggerty, ―[t]he FDR refused 
to participate in the elections, citing fears for the safety of possible candidates, the lack 
of proper political conditions, and the inordinate influence of the United States. It 
maintained that negotiations between the FMLN-FDR and the government should 
precede the holding of elections.‖92 The FMLN intimidated voters and disrupted voting 
across the country.  The PDC gained a plurality in the Constituent Assembly but an 
ARENA-led coalition raised the possibility that D‘Aubuisson would be elected 
provisional president. To prevent a rightist victory, US Ambassador to El Salvador 
Deane R. Hinton spent weeks negotiating a pact between the political parties and the 
military to create a national unity government. A crisis was averted as D‘Aubuisson 
became president of the Constituent Assembly and PDC candidate Álvaro Magaña was 
elected president.
93
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Congress unsuccessfully attempted to condition aid based on El Salvador‘s 
human rights record. The administration‘s democracy promotion policy failed to win the 
support of liberal Democrats who focused on human rights violations and the lack of 
reform.  They raised these issues with the passage of Section 728(d) of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 in late December 1981. Known as 
the ―certification requirement,‖ this bill required the administration to certify to 
Congress 30 days after enactment of the bill and every 180 days that the Salvadoran 
government was making progress in human rights, controlling the FAES, economic and 
political reforms, free elections, negotiations to end the war, and the investigation of the 
murdered American churchwomen and AIFLD advisors.
94
 The certification requirement  
would determine if the Salvadoran government received US aid. Between February 1982 
and July 1983, four certification hearings were held before the House Subcommittee on 
Inter-American Affairs.
95
 According to scholar Cynthia J. Arnson, the definition of 
―progress‖ undermined Congress‘ ability to condition US aid during the certification 
process: the definition was ambiguous and ―the administration possessed superior 
information about events on the ground and therefore a greater ability to manipulate 
information to its advantage.‖96 The State Department‘s methodology for determining 
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progress, the subject of harsh criticism during the hearings, hid the fact that that there 
was little or no progress on any condition.
97
  
Frustrated at the Salvadoran government‘s lack of progress on the cases of the 
murdered Americans, its inability to stop the death squads, or engage in dialogue with 
the FDR-FMLN, Ambassador Hinton used his October 29, 1982 speech to the American 
Chamber of Commerce in San Salvador to denounce the extreme right. He declared in 
front of Salvadoran oligarchs that 30,000 Salvadorans had been ―murdered, not killed in 
battle, murdered‖ by ―the Mafia‖ and that US aid would be cut unless the level of human 
rights violations decreased.
98
 The White House rebuked Hinton for his speech and fired 
him in the spring of 1983.  
The deteriorating situation in El Salvador in 1983 pushed the administration to 
return to a hard-line policy.
99
 After recovering from the Final Offensive, the FMLN 
carried out successful large-scale operations in 1982 and 1983, inflicted heavy FAES 
casualties, and controlled large areas of the country.
100
 A December 1983 State 
Department analysis of the military situation stated that the FMLN ―[had] built up 
momentum which, if allowed to go unchecked, [would] undermine the government‘s 
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ability to maintain morale and cohesion necessary to sustain a military effort in the field 
and to retain popular support.‖101 In summary, the FAES was losing the war. However, 
Congress still limited administration requests for increased military aid. Congress 
approved half of Fiscal Year (FY) 1983 military aid from reprogramming and 
supplemental requests, limited military aid to $64.8 million FY 1984 and FY 1985 and 
capped the number of U.S. military advisors at 55.
102
 Reagan sought to divide 
Democratic opposition by establishing in July 1983 the National Bipartisan Commission 
on Central America chaired by Henry Kissinger.
103
 Although the commission 
recommended in January 1984 increased military aid conditioned on human rights 
progress, it failed to establish a bipartisan consensus in Congress over Reagan‘s El 
Salvador policy.
104
    
Hinton‘s replacement, US Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering convinced the 
Reagan administration to make a concerted effort for the first time to pressure the 
Salvadoran government and military to reduce human rights abuses and end right-wing 
death squad activities.
105
 Like Hinton, Pickering used his speech to the American 
Chamber of Commerce on November 25, 1983 to condemn the death squads.
106
  
Although the certification process did not lead to aid cuts, on November 20, 1983 
Reagan pocket vetoed the extension of the certification requirements for another year, an 
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action that undermined Pickering‘s campaign. He persuaded the administration to send 
Vice President George Bush to confront senior FAES officers in December 1983.
107
 
Bush offered to request an increase in military aid if the FAES carried out the required 
actions before January 10, 1984, the day Congress reconvened. These actions included 
the expulsions of dozens of officers and civilians linked to death squad activities, the 
arrest of National Guard Captain Eduardo Avila, one of the officers involved in the 
planning of the murder of the two AIFLD advisors, and the start of the trial of the 
National Guardsmen accused of killing the four churchwomen.
108
 Dated January 20, 
1984, a CIA intelligence memorandum stated that Avila had been arrested and death 
squads killings decreased the month after Bush‘s visit but ―several Army commanders 
with past death squad associations…were appointed to new leadership positions.‖109 
Three years after their arrest, five National Guardsmen were found guilty in May 1984 
of murdering the four American churchwomen.  
Congressional opposition to US aid to El Salvador peaked in the spring of 1984. 
Based on the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission, Reagan requested on 
February 3 over $300 million in supplemental FY 1984 aid: $178.7 million in military 
aid, $90 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), and $40 million for development 
aid. He also requested $132.5 million in military aid, $210 million in ESF, and 131.1 
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million in development aid for FY 1985.
110
  Opponents of Reagan‘s El Salvador policy 
attempted to impose strict conditions on the aid requests.  
Reagan personally intervened in the debate over US aid to El Salvador by 
delivering speeches before Congress and the American public in 1983 and 1984. He 
used the global balance of power argument and domino theory and threatened to blame 
his opponents if Central America fell under communist domination.
111
  According to 
Robert A. Pastor, Director of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs on the National 
Security Council during the Carter administration, Reagan effectively used fear to 
influence the debate:  
[wh]en Reagan said the national security of all the Americas was at stake in 
Central America, his critics feared he was going to war, and his supporters hoped 
he would. Both were wrong. All Reagan was doing was trying to scare Congress 
into supporting his program. In his memoirs, he wrote that he never intended to 
send troops to Central America, and that is probably true.
112
  
 
Reagan achieved decisive victories when moderate and conservative Democrats sided 
with him and voted for nearly all of his FY 1984 supplemental requests and placed mild 
conditions on his FY 1985 requests.
113
 
The turning point of the debate in Congress was the 1984 Salvadoran presidential 
election. The two main candidates were Duarte and D‘Aubuisson. Although the 
administration had supported the PDC in the March 1982 elections, it feared that a 
victory by either candidate in 1984 would prevent the formation of a unified 
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government, provoke a military coup, and lead to aid cuts. Secretly, the administration 
preferred the traditional conservative Partido de Conciliación Nacional candidate 
Francisco Guerrero.
114
 When Guerrero was eliminated in the first round of voting, the 
administration supported Duarte in the May 6 runoff election. Duarte defeated 
D‘Aubuisson and became El Salvador‘s first elected civilian president since 1931.115 
Duarte‘s victory, according to Arnson, was the key to achieving bipartisan consensus 
over US policy toward El Salvador: ―Duarte‘s announced commitment to reform, 
combined with his electoral mandate from Salvadoran voters, translated into a virtual 
political imperative in Washington to ‗give Duarte a chance.‘‖116 After having been 
denied the presidency in 1972 and sent into exile until 1979, Duarte‘s second chance to 
lead El Salvador had arrived.  From 1985 to 1988, Congress approved administration‘s 
requests for economic and military assistance and set softened conditions on the 
assistance.
 117
 By 1989, US aid to El Salvador totaled $4.45 billion, making El Salvador 
the fifth largest recipient of US aid during most of the 1980s.
118
 When a bipartisan El 
Salvador policy was achieved, the Reagan administration and Congress focused their 
attention toward US support of the Contras. US involvement in the Nicaraguan civil war 
became the most controversial issue of the second half of the 1980s.   
The Reagan administration made little effort to end Central America‘s civil wars 
through negotiated political settlements. According to LeoGrande, hard-liners opposed 
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negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the FDR-FMLN, ―over 
‗powersharing‘ (that is, giving the guerrillas or their civilian allies any role in the 
government)‖ because they believed negotiations constituted a defeat for El Salvador 
and the US.
119
  In order to placate critics of Reagan‘s policies, Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders proposed in 1983 a ―two –track‖ policy for 
Central America. The first track consisted of economic and military aid to the 
Salvadoran government. The second track involved the promotion of a regional peace 
process to end the wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Hard-liners contended that 
Ender‘s proposal would prevent military victory. Reagan fired Enders along with 
Ambassador Deane Hinton in May 1983. He was replaced by neoconservative Elliot 
Abrams. After these firings, the Reagan administration made no attempt to facilitate 
negotiations in any Central America conflict.
120
  
Without consulting the Reagan administration, President Duarte announced on 
October 8, 1984 before the UN General Assembly that he was willing to engage in 
dialogue with the FMLN. With reluctant support from the US, Duarte met with FDR 
delegates and FMLN comandantes (commanders) for the first time on October 15 in the 
town of La Palma. These talks were mediated by the Catholic Church but failed to 
produce a political settlement as the FMLN refused to lay down their arms and 
participate in the democratic process and Duarte opposed powersharing. Both sides met 
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again on November 30 in Ayagualo but Duarte did not attend. These talks also ended in 
failure as both sides made extreme demands.
121
  
Latin American leaders took action to end Central America‘s wars through 
political solutions. In January 1983, the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, 
and Venezuela met on the Panamanian island of Contadora to discuss a peace initiative 
for Central America.
122
 On September 9, 1983, these four countries collectively known 
as the Contadora Group, convinced Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua to sign a document outlining 21 economic, political, and security objectives 
for the region such as democracy promotion and ending the use of national territory to 
destabilize other states.
123
 This document formed the basis for future peace agreements.  
From June 1984 to June 1986, the Contadora Group and a Support Group of 
Latin American nations developed three drafts of a peace treaty, the Contadora Act. The 
Contadora Group focused its efforts on ending the war between the Sandinista 
government and the Contras in Nicaragua. United Nations official Alvaro de Soto 
contended that the Contadora Group failed to reach a definitive peace agreement during 
this period because the 21 objectives were overly ambitious and it excluded all insurgent 
groups from the peace process. Furthermore, the Central Americans felt patronized by 
the four foreign ministers.
124
 The Reagan administration publicly supported the 
Contadora peace process but hard-liners covertly worked to undermine any peace treaty 
                                                 
121
 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, 187-189. 
122
 For more information on the Contadora process, see Jack Child, The Central American Peace Process, 
1983-1991: Sheating Swords, Building Confidence (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), part 2.  
123
 Child, The Central American Peace Process, 174-177. 
124
 De Soto, ―Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador,‖ 353. 
35 
 
with the Sandinistas.
125
 In 1986, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and de Soto 
discussed the possibility of UN participation in Central America as part of a joint effort 
with the Organization of America States (OAS). However, Pérez de Cuéllar dropped the 
UN-OAS proposal in late 1986 in the face of opposition from the Reagan administration 
and the Contadora Group.
126
  
The Contadora process stalled until Costa Rican President Óscar Arias convened 
a summit meeting of the Contadora Group in San José, Costa Rica on February 15, 1987. 
His peace proposal, the Arias Plan, built upon previous Contadora drafts but emphasized 
democratization in Nicaragua and the end of aid to the Contras.
127
 After months of 
lobbying for support of his peace plan in the US, Latin America, and Europe, Arias 
convinced the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua to sign the Esquipulas II Accord in Guatemala City, Guatemala on August 7, 
1987. Esquipulas II was a procedure for establishing peace in the region through 
measures such as national reconciliation, free elections, an end of aid to irregular forces 
and insurgent movements, and an international verification commission to enforce 
compliance.
128
 Arias received the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1987 for his efforts to 
bring peace to Central America. In response to the Esquipulas II Accord, the Salvadoran 
government and the FDR-FMLN held peace talks on October 4, 1987 at the Vatican 
mission in El Salvador. Both sides presented and rejected the same demands as in 
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October and November 1984 but agreed to establish two commissions, one to seek 
cease-fire arrangements and another to guarantee compliance with Esquipulas II.
129
 The 
FMLN broke off peace talks scheduled for November 4 in Mexico after the killing of the 
country‘s senior nongovernmental human rights official on October 26.130 Peace talks 
did not resume until February 1989.  
The US military advisory effort was an important component of the Reagan 
administration‘s El Salvador policy. Under the direction of a US Military Group, 55 US 
advisors trained the FAES to fight the FMLN and respect human rights and 
democracy.
131
 The USMILGP Commander managed the security assistance program and 
was subordinate to the US ambassador and the Commander in Chief of United States 
Southern Command in Panama. The US Embassy, USMILGP, the Salvadoran 
government and military cooperated to design a political-military strategy to win popular 
support by clearing areas of guerrillas, providing security, and carrying out government 
social and economic development.
132
  
US military assistance transformed the FAES into a more capable fighting force. 
Teams composed mostly of US Army Special Forces, instructed FAES battalion and 
brigades in conventional and counterinsurgency strategies and tactics and subjects such 
as intelligence, logistics, and communications.
133
 Strict rules of engagement, however, 
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prevented them from being allowed in or near combat situations.
134
 Americans trained 
Salvadorans in El Salvador, the United States, Honduras, and Panama. The size of the 
FAES increased with the creation of new counterguerrilla units. The largest of these new 
specialized units were the light infantry battalions, the Battalion de Infanteria Reaccion 
Inmediata (Immediate Reaction Battalions or BIRI). The Atlacatl, the first of five BIRIs, 
was trained in El Salvador by a single team of advisors in March 1981.
135
 In addition to 
the advisory effort, the US provided the FAES with M-16 rifles, ammunition, boots, 
battle dress, field gear, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, heavy weapons, and tactical 
intelligence.
136
 US assistance and training increased the size of the FAES from 11,000 in 
1979 to 56,000 by 1990.
137
  
US advisors actively promoted respect for human rights and democracy.  They 
provided human rights training, emphasized respect for democratic principles, and 
taught the proper treatment of civilians and captured combatants as described by the 
Geneva Convention.
138
 In addition, the FAES received human rights training from its 
own officers, a government human rights commission, and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. Although US advisors were not legally required to report human rights 
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violations, Standard Operating Procedure stated they were to stop any violations and if 
unable to, report the violation to the Commander.
139
  
Human rights violations by government forces and death squads decreased after 
1983. There were fewer cases of severe torture, massacres of civilians, and 
indiscriminate killings through aerial and artillery bombardments by government 
forces.
140
 US Embassy statistics showed that the monthly averages for death squad 
killings declined from 750 in 1980 to 64 in 1984 to 17 in 1989.
141
 Human rights abuses 
by the FAES in the second half of the 1980s received less attention, Americas Watch 
argued, because ―when comparisons to the early 1980s [were] invoked, the current level 
of abuses seem[ed] low. This [was] known as improvement…[C]omparisons permit[ted] 
much of the world to see the current levels of abuses as a tolerable human rights 
situation.‖142 Scholars Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter argued that US advisors can 
take some credit for this decline but it was more likely the result of political expediency 
and the fact that there were fewer potential targets.
143
 Benjamin C. Schwarz, a former 
foreign policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, contends that the advisory effort did 
not lead to an attitudinal change: ―the armed forces retain[ed] an almost uncanny ability 
to turn citizens into enemies. Continually reverting to their old ways, they commit[ed] 
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abuses with a regularity that squander[ed] whatever goodwill they manage[d] to 
engender.‖144  
Despite human rights and democracy promotion efforts, moreover, US-trained 
units carried out abuses and atrocities throughout the war. The worst atrocities were 
carried out by the most feared US-trained FAES unit, the Atlacatl BIRI. The Atlacatl‘s 
brutality was first displayed at the largest massacre of the war at El Mozote. During a 
search and destroy operation, the Atlacatl commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Domingo 
Monterrosa, entered the village of El Mozote in northeastern El Salvador on December 
10, 1981. For the next three days, the Atlacatl systematically detained, tortured, raped, 
and murdered almost 800 civilians in El Mozote and surrounding villages.
145
 During the 
first certification hearing in February 1982, the Reagan administration, despite witness 
testimony and evidence provided by The New York Times and Washington Post, 
dismissed allegations of a massacre as FMLN propaganda.
146
  No Atlacatl officers or 
soldiers were punished for the El Mozote massacre. Furthermore, Monterrosa was 
praised before his death in October 1984 as one of the most effective practitioners of 
counterinsurgency doctrine in El Salvador.
147
 The Atlacatl was also responsible for the 
deaths of hundreds of civilians in other atrocities including three massacres between 
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November 1983 and August 1984.
148
 The Atlacatl‘s blatant disregard for human rights 
culminated in its final atrocity, the Jesuit murders on November 16, 1989.   
The tanda system undermined American efforts to professionalize the 
Salvadoran officer corps. Tanda refers to a graduating class of officers, on average 20, 
from the four-year Escuela Militar Capitan General Gerarado Barrios (Captain General 
Gerardo Barrios Military Academy) in San Salvador. According to scholar Brian J. 
Bosch, tanda members  
 had in common a feeling of strong loyalty to their institution, which  
automatically meant to them loyalty to the nation. This conviction is revealed in 
a translation of their credo: ‗The Republic shall live as long as the Army shall 
live.‘ In practice, they became part of a powerful force within El Salvador‘s body 
politic. The young men joined an organization that was considered immune from 
the law and was accountable to no one but themselves.
149
 
 
Human rights abusers, corrupt and incompetent officers were not punished and were 
protected from prosecution by their fellow tanda members.
150
  
The civil war shifted in favor of the FAES in 1984. The FAES conducted 
aggressive large-scale sweeps and bombardments of FMLN-controlled areas. However, 
civil-military operations designed to isolate the FMLN and win popular support for the 
government had limited success.
151
 Despite massive American military assistance, the 
FAES continued to face problems such as a lack of coordination between the branches, 
poor operational planning, incompetent leadership, and difficulties maintaining 
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equipment.
152
 Although the FMLN lost significant combat strength after 1984, it adapted 
to increased FAES combat effectiveness by implementing a war of attrition strategy 
known as Prolonged Popular War. This strategy, composed of platoon-sized operations 
and economic and infrastructure sabotage, resulted in greater human rights violations.
 
The FMLN killed four US Marines in a San Salvador café and assassinated municipal 
officials and right-wing leaders. Its use of land mines led to high civilian casualties.
153
 
The Embassy under Edwin G. Corr, US Ambassador from August 1985 to August 1988, 
emphasized guerrilla abuses and attempted to discredit claims of government abuses 
made by victims and human rights monitors.
154
 The CIA stated in a February 1989 
Special National Intelligence Estimate that the direction of the war favored the FAES but 
predicted the war would continue for another three to five years.
155
 
In the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal, the George H. W. Bush 
administration sought to rebuild bipartisan support in Congress for US policy toward 
Central America. Bipartisan consensus would remove Central America from the foreign 
policy agenda and allow the administration to focus without distractions on the Soviet 
Union. James A. Baker III stated that his first priority as incoming Secretary of State was 
this task.
156
 According to The New York Times correspondent Mark A. Uhlig, the 
administration had recognized that ―Central America has become a subject of high 
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political cost and minimum political benefit.‖ 157 Negotiations between the 
administration and Congress concentrated on the peace process in Nicaragua. To show 
the administration‘s commitment to bipartisanship, Baker selected Bernard W. Aronson 
to replace Elliott Abrams as the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. 
Aronson‘s key credential according to Baker was that he was a Democrat who supported 
aid to the Contras.
158
 After three months of negotiations, the Bush administration and 
Congress signed the Bipartisan Accord on Central America on March 24, 1989. In 
addition to expressing ―support of democracy, peace, and security in Central America,‖ 
both sides agreed to provide humanitarian aid to the Contras and support democratic 
elections in Nicaragua. The bipartisan accord did not even mention the Salvadoran civil 
war.
159
  
The Bush administration did not focus its attention in 1989 on the Salvadoran 
civil war because it had inherited a status quo El Salvador policy. The battles between 
the Reagan administration and Congress in the early 1980s resulted in a bipartisan policy 
based on a commitment to democracy, human rights, and El Salvador‘s security from 
leftist and rightist extremists.
160
 Administration officials did not consider El Salvador a 
vital national security issue. They avoided the rhetoric of the global balance of power 
argument and domino theory in favor of pragmatic and realist language when describing 
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US policy toward El Salvador. They spoke of El Salvador as a fragile democracy and not 
a Cold War battleground. The National Security Council held no meetings on El 
Salvador during the entire term.
161
 The administration conducted no National Security 
Reviews and issued no National Security Directives regarding El Salvador.
162
 El 
Salvador briefly reemerged as a national security issue in November and December 
1989. The NSC Deputies Committees held meetings on El Salvador on November 21, 
December 6, and December 9, 1989.
163
 The last two meetings discussed 
recommendation that the US establish a limited naval presence off the Salvadoran coast. 
Documents on these three meetings remain heavily redacted. The Policy Coordination 
Committee regularly addressed US policy toward El Salvador after November 1989 and 
developed policy options for the NSC to consider.  
US-Salvadoran relations entered a new phase in 1989 when ARENA won its first 
presidential election. On March 19, 1989, ARENA candidate Alfredo Cristiani defeated 
Fidel Chávez Mena of the PDC in El Salvador‘s second presidential election since 
October 1979. Following its losses in the 1984 presidential election and the March 1985 
Legislative Assembly elections, ARENA sought to improve its domestic and 
international image by selecting as party leader a moderate with coffee industry ties and 
who according to the CIA ―was untainted by charges of corruption or connections to 
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death squads or rightwing extremism.‖164 Cristiani‘s victory finished the Salvadoran 
government‘s derechización (shift to the right) that had begun in March 1988 when 
ARENA became the majority party in the Legislative Assembly and municipal 
governments. A major goal of US policy toward El Salvador since the Carter 
administration had been the establishment of a centrist government. The Duarte 
administration‘s failed economic policies and rampant corruption undermined this policy 
goal and led to the PDC‘s defeat.165  
The Salvadoran government‘s shift to the right was accompanied by the rise of 
the 1966 tanda within the FAES senior leadership. Led by Colonel René Emilio Ponce 
who graduated first in his class, this 47-member tanda was known as the Tandona (―Big 
Class‖).166 The Tandona‘s large size resulted from a High Command decision to accept a 
larger than average class in 1963 to offset a 1961 decision to not accept any cadets in 
1962.
167
 Colonel Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, President Duarte‘s Minister of 
Defense and a 1957 tanda member, facilitated the Tandona‘s ascendency. When filling 
High Command positions in 1988, Vides Casanova broke the traditional system of 
promotion by skipping over officers from the 1963 and 1964 tandas for Tandona 
members, many of whom were combat veterans. The positions in the High Command 
not filled by the Tandona officers were the Minister of Defense and Commander of the 
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Air Force.
168
 Vides Casanova lobbied incoming President Cristiani to appoint Ponce as 
Minister of Defense instead of General Juan Rafael Bustillo. Cristiani compromised by 
appointing General Rafael Humberto Larios as Minister of Defense and Ponce as Chief 
of Staff. By June 1989, the Tandona had a disproportionate influence within the FAES.  
Cristiani‘s victory provoked the first debate in Congress since 1984 over US aid 
to El Salvador. In an April 6 letter, 24 members of Congress urged Bush to ―to request 
President Cristiani to distance himself from Roberto D‘Aubuisson‘s reign of terror by 
disbanding the death squads and bringing them to justice‖ and expressed concern ―that 
the ARENA victory [would] lead to polarization of the warring parties and death and 
alienation of the citizens who are caught in the middle.‖169 When Cristiani met with 
members of Congress in Washington in mid-April, he insisted that D‘Aubuisson was no 
longer the face of ARENA and that he would seek a political solution to end the war.
170
 Less than a month after the signing of the Bipartisan Accord on Central America, 
Democrats attempted to restrict US aid to El Salvador. On April 13, Democrats on the 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs added to HR 2655, the 
fiscal 1990-91 foreign aid authorization bill, provisions that limited military aid to $85 
million and imposed conditions similar to the 1981 certification requirement.
171
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Congress and the Bush administration were unable to reach an agreement over 
restrictions by June 6 when the provisions were modified. The most contentious 
provisions required advance approval from four committees before aid could be spent. 
The stalemate in negotiations ended when both sides agreed on June 13 to allow 
Congress to block aid to El Salvador only through a joint resolution over a presidential 
veto.
172
 The House passed HR 2655 on June 29 but had removed nearly all of the 
provisions on El Salvador.  
The debate over El Salvador shifted to the Senate in September. Democrats on 
the Senate Appropriations Committee included in the fiscal 1990 foreign aid 
appropriations measure, HR 2939, an amendment cutting military aid from Bush‘s 
request of $97 million to $85 million with conditions attached. The amendment was 
rejected on September 20 by the Senate including Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT), 
one of the strongest critics of US policy toward Central America during the 1980s. Dodd 
opposed the provision because he believed it would undermine Cristiani whom Dodd 
believed was committed to reform and peace. With Dodd‘s support, the Senate raised the 
military aid limit to $90 million.
173
 The Senate passed HR 2939 on September 26 with 
no restrictions on US aid.  
The Bush administration approached US-Soviet relations with realism and 
prudence. Administration officials were skeptical that the leader of the Soviet Union, 
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General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev, was trustworthy or a true 
reformer. Despite the constructive relationship that had developed between Reagan and 
Gorbachev in the late 1980s, Bush‘s foreign policy advisors including Secretary of State 
Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft insisted the Cold War was not 
over.
174
 At the start of the term, the administration conducted a three-month foreign 
policy review, known as ―the pause,‖ of US-Soviet relations. The review produced a 
report that contained no specific policy initiatives and presented an ambivalent analysis 
of Gorbachev‘s reforms.175 After the NSC conducted a more exhaustive analysis, Bush 
presented his foreign policy goals in a series of four speeches in April and May 1989. 
His commencement address at Texas A&M University on May 12 outlined the 
administration‘s policy toward the Soviet Union, ―beyond containment.‖ This policy, 
according to historian Christopher Maynard, ―recognized that the Soviet Union was in 
the midst of change, but it challenged the Soviet Union to demonstrate with actions their 
commitment to Gorbachev‘s principles.‖176  
The Bush administration challenged the Soviet Union‘s commitment to the 
policy of novoe politicheskoe myshlenie (―new thinking‖). Presented by Gorbachev in 
February 1986, ―new thinking‖ emphasized according to Paszyn, ―the demilitarization of 
regional conflicts and the search for political solutions based on a balance of 
interests[,]…not viewing regional conflicts through the prism of East-West… [,and] 
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opposing the export of revolution.‖177 However, ―the biggest thorn in US-Soviet 
relations [in 1989],‖ Scowcroft stated, ―remained in Central America where the Soviets 
still supported their client Nicaragua and, through it and Cuba, the guerrillas in El 
Salvador.‖178 Throughout 1989, CIA intelligence reports and weapons and ammunition 
captured by Salvadoran military and police forces indicated major Cuban and 
Nicaraguan arms shipments to El Salvador.
179
 The administration argued that the arms 
shipments demonstrated that Soviet Union was not pressuring its client states to stop 
supporting the FMLN.
180
  
The year 1989 transformed US-Soviet relations.
181
 In the spring and summer of 
1989, Gorbachev refused to intervene as democratic revolutions toppled communist 
governments in Eastern Europe.
182
 Bush contacted Gorbachev in July after recognizing 
that Gorbachev‘s inaction demonstrated his commitment to peace and reform. Both sides 
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agreed to their first face-face meeting at the island of Malta on December 2-3.
183
 When 
the Berlin Wall fell on November 9 and the Soviet Union did not intervene, Bush‘s 
reaction was criticized as detached and uninspired. However, he recognized that this 
momentous event, if handled carefully, could lead to the peaceful resolution of the Cold 
War.
184
  
 As the world celebrated the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Bush administration was 
reminded that the Cold War in Central America was not over. On November 11, 1989, 
the FMLN launched its largest offensive of the war. After years of preparation, over 
2,000 fighters launched coordinated attacks inside San Salvador. The FMLN‘s strategy, 
the Strategic Counter-Offensive, called for the occupation and fortification of 
neighborhoods and the assassination of the President and other senior civilian and 
military leaders. The FMLN sought to inspire the population to join an insurrection 
against the government.
185
 However, the offensive failed militarily as the assassination 
teams did not kill any leaders, the FAES removed the guerrillas from the neighborhoods, 
and Salvadorans refused to support a popular insurrection. By early December, the 
FAES had pushed the majority of fighters outside the city resulting in over 2,000 fighters 
and 500 government soldiers dead.
186
  
The size and audacity of the offensive exposed the weaknesses of the FAES.  
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Bush administration officials described the FMLN as desperate and insisted that the 
offensive did not threaten the Salvadoran government but on November 16, Cristiani 
requested arms and ammunition to replenish depleted stocks.
187
 On November 21, 
FMLN fighters stormed the Sheraton Hotel, located in one of San Salvador‘s wealthiest 
neighborhoods, trapping OAS Secretary General João Baena Soares, 12 US Army 
Special Forces personnel, and 17 civilians. Bush and his advisors discussed possible 
actions to end the siege and even deployed a small contingent of the elite counterterrorist 
unit Delta Force to prepare for a rescue operation.
188
 However, the FMLN fighters ended 
the siege and slipped away on November 22 even though the hotel was surrounded by 
the Salvadoran military.
189
 An April 9, 1990 State Department cable revealed that 
contrary to public statements made by State Department spokeswoman Margaret 
Tutwiler, the US had negotiated with the FMLN ―to help ensure the safety of U.S. 
military trainers who were trapped in the hotel.‖190 The Defense Attaché stated in a 
December 9 cable that young officers reportedly demanded that Cristiani remove senior 
officers who displayed poor leadership and other failures or else they would revolt 
against said officers.
191
 The FAES, according to Schwartz, had failed to pursue and 
destroy retreating guerrillas thus missing an opportunity to end the war.
192
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On the morning of November 16, 1989, assailants murdered Father Ignacio 
Ellacuría, five other Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her daughter on the campus of the 
UCA in San Salvador.
193
 The FAES stated that the FMLN was responsible as evidenced 
by Soviet-made AK-47s left at the crime scene and FMLN graffiti spray painted on the 
walls of the university.
194
 The revelation that the FAES had murdered the Jesuits and 
covered up the crime would shatter bipartisan consensus over the El Salvador policy.   
The November 1989 offensive increased tensions between the United States and 
the Soviet Union over Central America. In his speech to the OAS on November 13, 
1989, Secretary Baker accused the Soviet Union of undermining ―new thinking‖ and the 
Central American peace process through its military aid shipments to Cuba and 
Nicaragua.
195
 The issue of Soviet military aid further strained superpower relations when 
a Cesna 310 carrying 24 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and other weapons crashed on 
November 25 in southeastern El Salvador.
196
 Yuri Petrov, the Soviet ambassador to 
Cuba, confronted Fidel Castro in late November 1989 about the SA-7 missiles. Castro 
denied any Cuban involvement in the delivery of Soviet weapons to El Salvador via 
Nicaragua.
197
 Yuri Pavlov, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry‘s Latin American 
Department, contended that the missile shipments ―[were] a clear betrayal of the Soviet 
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policy in the area of the widely supported negotiation process. Unable to influence this 
policy, Castro resorted to outright deceit, misleading Petrov and trying to dupe 
Gorbachev and [Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard] Shevardnadze.‖198   
President Bush raised the issue of arms shipments to the FMLN at the Malta 
summit. On November 27, Cristiani sent a letter to Bush urging him press the Soviets to 
end military shipments to Nicaragua.
199
 The same day,  he visited Ambassador William 
Walker and ―request[ed] that U.S. naval vessels make an overt show of force in the 
Pacific Ocean, both in international and Salvadoran waters…[to] deter further 
Nicaraguan intrusion into El Salvador territory‖ and end the further internationalization 
of the conflict.
200
 On the first day of the Malta summit, December 2, Gorbachev insisted 
that the Soviet Union had stopped weapons shipments to Cuba and Nicaragua and stated 
―…we need mutual understanding. We don‘t want bridgeheads in Cuba or Central 
America. We don‘t need that. You must be convinced of that.‖201 Following the Malta 
summit, according to Pavlov, the State Department and Soviet Foreign Ministry began 
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exchanging ideas on how to bring peace to Central America and end Cuban 
interventionism in the region.
202
 The Malta success ended in success as Bush and 
Gorbachev established a strong personal relationship. ―The key accomplishment of 
Malta,‖ according to Scowcroft, ―was the exchange on almost every topic of mutual 
interest, which made clear the attitudes of each on a whole series of issues. This gave us 
a much more reliable indicator of the perils and opportunities we faced.‖203 The events 
of 1989 transformed the international system and made possible the end of the Cold War 
in 1990.   
November 1989 marked the turning point of US policy toward El Salvador. The 
FMLN offensive failed militarily but succeeded politically. The CIA argued in a January 
1990 memorandum that the FMLN had won the war of domestic and international 
perceptions. Domestically, the offensive ―shook the faith of many Salvadorans—
particularly those directly affected by the fighting—in the government‘s ability to 
provide for their security.‖ Internationally, the Jesuit murders ―evoked memories of the 
rampant human rights abuses of the early 1980s and cast the government as ineffectual 
at best, and, at worst, openly repressive.‖204 The offensive shattered the assumption that 
the FAES was making progress against the FMLN. Government forces did not appear to 
be any closer to winning the war. Billions of dollars of US assistance since 1980 had led 
to military stalemate.  
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The Bush administration now faced the burden of supporting a Cold War ally in 
the emerging post-Cold War era. Efforts to promote respect for human rights failed with 
the Jesuit murders which according to LeoGrande, ―symbolized the core problem of El 
Salvador: the military had no respect for the rule of law, and civilian political institutions 
had no way to hold it accountable.‖205 Human rights would again divide the executive 
and legislative branches in the debate over US military to El Salvador. The Bush 
administration would confront one of its most difficult challenges: pressuring the 
Salvadoran government and armed forces to investigate the Jesuit murders and bring the 
killers to justice.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS, AND THE JESUIT MURDERS 
 
Despite the Bush administration‘s efforts to remove Central America from its 
foreign policy agenda, the Jesuit murders renewed the debate over US policy toward El 
Salvador. Human rights violations committed by the FAES again became a divisive 
issue in Congress. Despite its limited interests in human rights promotion, the Bush 
administration could not ignore the political costs of the Jesuit murders and US aid to the 
FAES. In his presidential memoir, Bush outlined his approach to human rights:  
There is resentment on the part of many foreign leaders when they deal with the 
United States, a notion that we arrogantly consider ourselves perfect while they 
still have far to go. Indeed, we often do seem to lecture and confront other 
nations publicly on issues such as human rights. For that reason I went out of my 
way to be careful in questioning foreign leaders or diplomats about their 
countries‘ internal affairs. I had no hesitancy in telling them of our commitment 
to human rights, but I tried to avoid becoming the pedantic lecturer.
206
  
 
However, in order to remove the albatross of El Salvador, the Bush administration 
lectured the Salvadorans about human rights for nearly two years. This chapter will 
examine how the Bush administration‘s promoted the resolution of the Jesuit case but 
how the Salvadoran officer corps undermined and obstructed it.  
 Starting in the mid-1980s, the US promoted the ―new case‖ theory of human 
rights in El Salvador. This theory postulated that the Salvadoran government and 
military would respond differently to new human rights violations because they ―(A) 
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recognize[d] and accept[ed] the importance of this issue to [the] present assistance 
relationship [with the US]; and (B) ha[d] been given the technical and human resources 
to investigate, assign responsibility and prosecute wrongdoers when a violation 
occurs.‖207 Theoretically, the Salvadoran government and military had recognized the 
importance of human rights through diplomatic initiatives such as Bush‘s visit in 
December 1983 and training by US military advisors. The second component of the new 
case theory focused on reforming El Salvador‘s weak judicial system by providing 
funding and training for the investigation and prosecution of human right violators. The 
mishandling of the AIFLD and American churchwomen cases by the Salvadoran judicial 
system demonstrated the need for reform. The US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was the lead agency in the bilateral justice program, the Judicial 
Reform Project, established in July 1984. USAID, the State Department, and the Justice 
Department supported efforts to review and modernize El Salvador‘s laws, provided 
judicial training, and trained prosecutors and justices of the peace.
208
 The Judicial 
Reform Project‘s most relevant initiative to the new case theory was the Commission on 
Investigations comprised of the Special Investigative Unit and the Forensic Unit. 
Formed in July 1985, the SIU and the Forensic Unit were highly-trained teams of 
Salvadoran investigators, paralegals, and forensic technicians, mostly active-duty 
military, who conducted comprehensive investigations of a variety of crimes.
209
 These 
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two units, managed by a FAES colonel, investigated old and new human rights cases 
such as the assassination of Archbishop Romero, the San Sebastián massacre, and the 
Jesuit murders.
210
  
The passage of the October 1987 amnesty law hindered American and 
Salvadoran judicial reform efforts. Esquipulas II, which President Duarte had signed in 
August 1987, contained a provision for general amnesty.
211
 The Legislative Assembly 
approved on October 27 amnesty for all political and related common crimes committed 
before October 22, 1987 including the AIFLD case. Although intended to promote 
national reconciliation, the law undermined the new case theory by preventing 
investigations and prosecutions of prior human rights abuses except the assassination of 
Archbishop Romero.
212
 Since the majority of human rights abuses were committed by 
government forces, Americas Watch argued that the amnesty law ―reinforc[ed] the sense 
of military impunity… [and] contributed to an increase in political killings by 
government forces and death squads in the months that followed.‖213 
After years of improvement, the human rights situation in El Salvador began to 
deteriorate in 1987. The US Embassy tracked an increase in murders by the FAES and 
death squads starting in May 1987 and stated that ―[f]or the first time in years, 
blindfolded bodies are again beginning to appear in San Salvador with their hands tied 
behind their backs.‖ The Embassy believed that the increase in political killings was 
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most likely due to the end of the state of emergency decree in January 1987: ―[t]he 
military [was] convinced that without the ability to detain people for more than 72 hours 
it [was] useless to arrest people and turn them over to the courts.‖214 Ambassador Edwin 
Corr reported to the State Department in June 1988 that the Salvadoran officer corps 
refused to cooperate with the judicial system‘s investigation and prosecution of human 
rights violations committed by government forces: ―the officer corps circles its wagons 
when faced with human rights scrutiny. In part from a skeleton-in-the-closet syndrome 
that keeps one officer from tattling on another for fear that each accused will become an 
accuser until all the long-buried secrets are unearthed.‖215 The deteriorating human 
rights situation prompted Secretary of State George Schultz to meet with senior 
Salvadoran officers on June 30, 1988. Unlike Vice President Bush‘s visit in December 
1983, Schultz did not threaten to cut aid but according to a June 24 briefing 
memorandum ―describe[d] why abuses [were] wrong and counterproductive… The 
primary objective [was] to get the ESAF to investigate cases thoroughly and rapidly and 
to punish the violators.‖216 Schultz emphasized that the increase in political killings was 
the only issue that would threaten the bipartisan consensus in the US Congress.  
Appointed US Ambassador to El Salvador in August 1988, William Walker 
advocated the new case theory. Walker had supported human rights promotion since its 
integration into US foreign policy. According to Washington Post correspondent Lee 
Hockstader, when Walker served as political counselor in El Salvador in the mid-1970s, 
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he criticized the State Department‘s handling of the case of an American citizen 
murdered by the Salvadoran military.
217
 A month after his return to El Salvador, Walker 
would face the first major human rights case of his term: the San Sebastián massacre.  
On September 21, 1988, 10 guerrillas were killed and one soldier was wounded 
in a FMLN ambush on the Jiboa antiterrorist infantry battalion of the Fifth Brigade near 
La Cebadilla in the district of San Sebastián. However, witnesses and the Salvadoran 
press reported that the ambush was actually a massacre of civilians. The confusion over 
the details of this high-profile case prompted Ambassador Walker to dispatch a fact-
finding team to the site of the killings on September 24.
218
 According to the military‘s 
version of the incident, the Jiboa battalion was escorting eight guerrilla detainees to a 
helicopter landing zone when the FMLN ambushed the patrol with mines and rifle fire. 
The ambush resulted in the deaths of all eight detainees and two attackers. However, the 
fact-finding team‘s survey of the site led it to question whether an ambush actually 
occurred. The team could not understand, for example, ―why were there no cartridge 
casings in the areas from which the FMLN supposedly fired at the patrol?‖219 The 
Embassy‘s Defense Attaché summarized three conflicting versions of the incident from 
brigade commander Colonel José Emilio Chávez, chief of the Intelligence Department of 
the Fifth Brigade, Major Mauricio de Jesus Beltran, and two soldiers.
220
 These versions 
only produced more questions about what happened. An examination of nine bodies by 
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investigators revealed that ―all contained bullet wounds, seven with powder burns that 
indicated they were shot at very close range.‖221 This and other evidence collected by the 
SIU and Forensic Unit led the Embassy to conclude in an October 8 cable to the State 
Department that the 10 people were most likely summarily executed.
222
  
The US stressed the importance of a full investigation of the massacre to 
Salvadoran civilian and military leaders. In a December 13, 1988 meeting with 
Salvadoran Foreign Minister Ricardo Acevedo, Walker argued that a lack of progress in 
the investigation increased Congressional scrutiny of US assistance to El Salvador and 
threatened the credibility of the Salvadoran government.
223
 The military, however, 
remained committed to the ambush story. Walker asserted in a January 7, 1989 cable to 
Secretary Schultz that the stalled investigation of the massacre demonstrated the failure 
of the new case theory because Duarte had not followed through on multiple assurances 
to pursue evidence even if it lead to the military.
224
 Walker contended that ―the Embassy 
and the Department must act now, and with all the leverage we can muster‖ to advance 
the investigation.
225
  
The Bush administration applied pressure on the FAES to resolve the stalled 
investigation. On February 3, 1989, Vice President Dan Quayle visited El Salvador and 
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delivered two speeches to two groups of senior FAES officers. Using language similar to 
Ambassador Deane Hinton‘s October 1982 speech to the American Chamber of 
Commerce, Quayle emphasized the gravity of the San Sebastián massacre and the 
damage it could have on the military‘s reputation: ―Let me be clear about this. I am not 
talking about civilian casualties accidentally inflicted in the heat of battle between 
military forces. These are inevitable in war…What you are being accused of…is cold-
blooded execution and conspiracy to cover up murder.‖226 The San Sebastián massacre 
was a test case, Quayle asserted, of their commitment to democracy and human rights. 
Following Quayle‘s speeches, Walker presented a list of actions required of the FAES. 
This list included full cooperation with the SIU, the relieving of command of Chávez, 
Beltran, and another officer, and the establishment of a special military board of inquiry 
to address FAES accountability. The FAES carried out all of these actions except that it 
merely transferred the three officers.
227
 Within one month of Quayle‘s visit, soldiers 
involved in the massacre confessed that Beltran ―planned and executed the operation 
which was intended as an assassination mission against the ten suspected…[FMLN] 
collaborators.‖228 A military board of inquiry, the Special Honor Commission, identified 
on March 9, 1989 Beltran and eight other military personnel as responsible for the 
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massacre of ten civilians and its cover-up.
229
 The soldiers were arrested and brought 
before a civilian court. Colonel Chávez, a Tandona member, was cleared of any 
wrongdoing.  
Despite the efforts of the Judicial Reform Project, El Salvador‘s judicial system 
failed to bring the perpetrators of the San Sebastián massacre to justice. In May 1990, a 
judge released all but Major Beltran and ruled SIU evidence inadmissible ―because the 
unit [was] not an auxiliary organ to the court.‖ This action and similar ones in other 
human rights cases involving the FAES led the Embassy to conclude in a May 12, 1990 
cable that ―El Salvador‘s judicial leaders have neither the integrity nor the political will 
to effect the reforms.‖230 By the end of the civil war, Beltran was still awaiting a trial. 
The Bush administration would encounter even greater resistance from the Salvadoran 
military to investigate the most notorious human rights case in El Salvador since the 
assassination of Archbishop Romero: the Jesuit murders.   
Before his death, Father Ignacio Ellacuría was one of the most influential figures 
in El Salvador. Ellacuría, a Spaniard who arrived in El Salvador in 1949, was a 
theologian and philosopher at the UCA. Ellacuría and the Jesuits were denounced during 
the 1980s as communists and subversives.
231
 The UCA, located near the Military 
Academy and the Estado Mayor Conjunto de la Fuerza Armada (the Estado Mayor or 
Joint Command of the Armed Forces), was bombed by rightwing organizations and was 
searched by the FAES for evidence of guerilla activities.  
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He advocated dialogue to end the war and served as an unofficial mediator 
between the Salvadoran government and FMLN. When the FMLN kidnapped President 
Duarte‘s daughter in September 1985, Ellacuría helped negotiate her release along with 
that of 23 mayors in exchange for the release of political prisoners and wounded FMLN 
fighters held by the government.
232
 Walker met with Ellacuria as recently as March 16, 
1989. During the meeting, Ellacuría ―stressed he had seen a positive change in U.S. 
policy…[pointing] specifically to Vice President Quayle‘s message on human rights and 
the U.S. response to the FMLN‘s initial peace proposal.‖233 In August 1989, President 
Cristiani consulted with Ellacuría to discuss possible arrangements for dialogue with the 
FMLN the following month.
234
  
The Jesuit murders provoked domestic and international outrage. The FMLN 
denied responsibility and blamed Cristiani and the senior FAES leadership. The funeral 
mass for the six Jesuits on November 19 was attended by Cristiani and his wife, 
religious and government representatives, students, Walker and his public affairs officer, 
and thousands of Salvadorans.
235
 In response to the murder of five Spanish-born Jesuits, 
the Spanish government suspended aid to El Salvador, demanded a complete 
investigation, and called for a cease-fire and peace negotiations.
236
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The Bush administration stated on November 16 that it ―condemn[ed] in the 
strongest possible terms the outrageous murder[s].‖237 However, at a fundraising 
luncheon for Republican senatorial candidate Lynn Martin in Chicago, Illinois, on 
November 20, two protestors interrupted Bush‘s remarks by shouting ―Why are we 
killing people in El Salvador?‖ and ―In the name of God, stop the repression in El 
Salvador! In the name of God, stop the repression in El Salvador!‖ When asked why the 
US supported the Salvadoran government, Bush responded by emphasizing Salvadoran 
democracy: ―...President Cristiani told me on the phone that they will do everything they 
can to bring to justice, whether they're from the right or the left, those who wantonly 
murdered those priests. But we must not pull our support away for a freely elected 
democratic government in Central America.‖238 In a letter to President Bush, the 
Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities condemned the murders as ―deliberate 
attempts to destroy the leadership of the prestigious university and to silence it as a voice 
of peace and justice in El Salvador.‖ The association called upon Bush to insist on a full 
investigation and to protect the UCA and other educational institutions in El Salvador.
239
  
Before adjourning for 1989, the House of Representatives and Senate adopted 
resolutions on November 20 and 21, respectively, condemning both the FMLN offensive 
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and the Jesuit priest murders and stating that US aid to El Salvador would depend on a 
complete investigation and prosecution of the killers.
240
  
In the first days after the murders, available evidence indicated the culpability of 
the Salvadoran right. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson 
said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 17 that he did not 
know who the killers were but ―‗[w]hat my gut tells me is that they were murdered by 
the right.‖241 The Embassy reported on November 19 that evidence showed that the 
killings were plotted during a November 15 meeting of D‘Aubuisson and his followers 
within the ARENA leadership. In a meeting reminiscent of the one when he ordered the 
assassination of Archbishop Romero, D‘Aubuisson directed his followers ―to clear the 
UCA nest of ‗subversives.‘‖ The lack of definitive information on the meeting, however, 
made Walker reluctant in ―ask[ing] Cristiani to declare all-out war on D‘Aubuisson.‖242 
In a meeting with Walker on December 4, D‘Aubuisson flatly denied the accusation by 
asserting ―that he of all people had the most to lose from the murder of the priests. He 
supported questioning all the military personnel who were in the area at the time and 
agreed that polygraphs should be used.‖243  
Outside observers blamed the FAES. Lucía Barrera de Cerna, a UCA 
housekeeper, told the Spanish embassy on November 22 that she had seen five men in 
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military uniforms in the UCA in the morning of November 16. Cerna and her family 
were flown to Miami, Florida, in late November, for four days of interrogation by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Cerna recanted her story but claimed she was pressured 
to do so.
244
 Americas Watch sent Secretary Baker a letter on November 17 claiming that 
the military was responsible because government forces had searched the UCA in the 
days before the murders.
245
 Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas said in sermon before 
the funeral mass for the Jesuits, without offering any evidence, that ―‗[t]here is a 
vehement presumption that the priests' killers were elements of the armed forces or were 
working closely with them.''
246
 In a November 21 letter to The New York Times, former 
US Ambassador Robert White contended that the FMLN offensive ―came as a gift, an 
opportunity [for the military] to wipe out not only insurgents but also priests, labor union 
organizers, peasant leaders and thousands of poor citizens who support change.‖247 On 
December 1, Walker accompanied by SOUTHCOM Commander in Chief General 
Maxwell R. Thurman spoke privately with the FAES High Command. Walker stated that 
Bush, Baker, and Aronson had personal interest in the investigation. Aware of the fact 
that outside observers blamed government forces, Walker warned that if the FAES did 
not fully support the investigation and prosecution of the killers regardless of their 
background, Congress could end US aid to El Salvador when it reconvened in January 
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1990. Thurman added that ―an investigation of this nature is a test of courage for the 
institution.‖248  
The SIU made costly errors in the first two months after the murders. According 
to Martha Doggett of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the SIU failed to 
pursue key investigative avenues. Witnesses informed the SIU that the Atlacatl 
Battalion, the most notorious FAES unit of the war, searched the UCA on the night of 
November 13 and was in the area on November 15-16 but the SIU did not interview any 
Atlacatl officers or soldiers until mid-December.
249
 When Atlacatl personnel were 
interviewed, they gave contradictory testimony on the location of the unit in the days 
leading up to murders.
250
 During the offensive, the UCA and the surrounding area were 
placed under the control of Military Academy Director Colonel Guillermo Benavides, a 
Tandona member. Benavides also had operational command of several FAES units 
including the Atlacatl. However, the SIU did not question Benavides until January.  
The turning point of the investigation came on January 2, 1990 when a US 
military advisor alleged that the FAES was responsible for the Jesuit murders. On 
December 20, 1989, Colonel Carlos Avilés told US Army Major Eric W. Buckland that 
Colonel Benavides had confessed to SIU Executive Director Lieutenant Colonel Manuel 
Antonio Rivas that he ordered the Atlacatl to murder the Jesuits. Rivas then withheld the 
information from the SIU. Buckland, however, did not share this information with his 
superior officers as required by Standard Operating Procedure until January 2 because 
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Avilés told him that Benavides could not be arrested until the investigation was 
completed.
251
 He did tell his sister in a telephone call and a December 25 letter and he 
also shared the information with another US advisor on December 28.
252
 Without 
informing Walker who was in Washington at the time, USMILGP Commander Milton 
Menjivar confronted FAES Chief of Staff Colonel Ponce on January 2 and told 
Buckland‘s story. Ponce denied any knowledge of the story and so did Avilés when 
Ponce called him into his office. In Washington on the same day, Walker said to 
Representative John Joseph (―Joe‖) Moakley (D-MA) that FMLN fighters wearing 
FAES uniforms could have killed the Jesuits and that there was no definitive evidence 
that military was responsible.
253
 Walker‘s comments are difficult to explain because he 
stated in a November 17 CIA memorandum analyzing potential suspects that available 
evidence ―[made] it extremely difficult to envision the assassination as acts of an FMLN 
hit squad.‖254 Buckland‘s allegations led to Cristiani publicly announcing on January 7 
that elements of the military were responsible for the murders and that he established a 
military Honor Commission to investigate. On January 13, Cristiani announced that the 
Honor Commission had named nine suspects: Benavides, four lieutenants, and four 
enlisted men (including one deserter). On January 18, Judge Ricardo Zamora charged 
the nine defendants with murder in a civilian court.
255
 Had it not been for Buckland‘s 
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testimony, the SIU would have continued to blame the FMLN and the conspiracy behind 
the Jesuit murders would never have been uncovered.   
The Jesuit murders were a major failure of the US military advisory effort. The 
three lieutenants that led the seven-man Atlacatl commando unit that murdered the 
Jesuits had received years of training by Americans.
256
 Even more damaging, before the 
Atlacatl was transferred to the Military Academy on November 13, it had received three 
days of training by US advisors. The Atlacatl personnel confessed to the SIU that 
Benavides had given the order to kill the Jesuits around 11:30 p.m. on November 15. 
Subsequently, the commando unit entered the UCA, encircled the Jesuit residence, took 
five Jesuits outside, and forced them to lie on the ground. After an unknown amount of 
time, they shot the Jesuits. The sixth Jesuit, the housekeeper and her daughter were 
killed inside the house. Before the commandos left the university, they wrote FMLN 
graffiti on the doors and walls and staged a battle by spraying the walls with machine 
gun and assault rifle fire, rockets, and grenades. The operation lasted between 1:00 a.m. 
and 2:30 a.m.
257
 The actions of the nine defendants and their superior officers would 
become a heavy burden for the Bush administration for almost two years.  
 The Jesuit murders galvanized Democrats and Republicans in Congress to cut US 
military aid to El Salvador. They questioned the rationale for supporting the FAES as the 
Cold War neared a peaceful resolution. Like the Bush administration, critics of the El 
Salvador policy, believed El Salvador no longer held the strategic importance as it had 
during the early 1980s. On February 8, Senator Dodd introduced legislation that would 
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withhold 50 percent of FY 1990 military aid and established a new certification 
requirement. The aid would be released if the FMLN refused to participate in peace 
negotiations or launched another offensive.
258
 On the same day, General Thurman stated 
to the Senate Committee on Armed Services that he believed the FAES could not defeat 
the FMLN and that only negotiations would end the war.
259
 Meeting on February 25, 
1990 with Colonel Ponce, Vice President Quayle, accompanied by Walker and Senator 
Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), stressed that unless the FAES 
made progress in the investigation, Congress would oppose the Bush administration‘s 
request for aid to El Salvador.
260
 
Starting in April 1990, Bush administration officials attempted to negotiate a 
bipartisan agreement on US policy toward El Salvador. In contrast to the Reagan 
administration, the Bush administration was willing to listen to Congress. This 
conciliatory approach was necessary to remove the burden of El Salvador and avoid 
another battle between the executive and legislative branches over the issue. The 
administration had recognized that El Salvador was a political liability. Both sides 
agreed that the US should support a negotiated political settlement between the 
Salvadoran government and the FMLN but disagreed on whether to cut US aid. 
According to an April 11, 1990 NSC document on bipartisan negotiations, the Bush 
administration was willing to cap military aid at $85 million and condition the release of 
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funds on Salvadoran performance in areas such as the peace process, progress in the 
Jesuit murder case, and judicial and military reform.
261
 This approach, the document 
stated, would ―reinforce President Cristiani‘s authority over [the] military… [and would] 
bring maturity to Salvadoran governmental institutions and Armed Forces.‖ The 
administration contended that an immediate cut in US aid would weaken the 
government‘s position in the peace process. Secretary Baker presented the proposal to 40 
representatives and senators the same month.
262
   
The interim report of the Special Task Force on El Salvador, released on April 
30, 1990, presented a bleak image of the Jesuit case. On December 6, 1989, House 
Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) appointed a task force composed of 19 Democratic 
Representatives led by Joe Moakley. The mandate of the Special Task Force was to 
monitor the Jesuit murder investigation and examine related issues. The Special Task 
Force visited El Salvador in January, February, and April 1990 and interviewed 
American and Salvadoran officials. The Special Task Force concluded that SIU‘s 
greatest failure was not considering the possibility of higher level involvement in the 
murders. Furthermore, the Special Task Force blamed the FAES for the stalled 
investigation and stated that the Salvadoran judicial system was still too weak to handle 
the Jesuit case.
263
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Negotiations between the Bush administration and Congress broke down in mid-
May over the House Democrats‘ linkage of the El Salvador issue to $720 million in 
emergency aid requests for Panama and Nicaragua in a supplementary spending bill. The 
emergency aid was intended to support the post-war reconstruction and emerging 
democratic institutions of both countries. According to Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
reporter John Felton, Bush accused Democrats of using linkage to ―[hold] aid for the 
new democracies in Central America ‗hostage.‘‖264 Democrats dropped the linkage on 
May 17 because they believed that the House would support a provision cutting aid to El 
Salvador in HR 4636, ―Fiscal 1990 Foreign Aid Supplemental Authorizations/Military 
Aid.‖ On May 22, 1990, the House debated HR 4636. Moakley and John P. Murtha (D-
PA) sponsored an amendment that capped military aid to El Salvador at $85 million and 
cut 50 percent of FY 1990 and FY 1991 military aid. Moakley delivered an emotional 
speech to convince the House to support the amendment: "Enough is enough…The time 
to act has come. They killed six priests in cold blood. I stood on the ground where my 
friends were blown away by men to whom the sanctity of human life bears no meaning - 
and men who will probably never be brought to justice."
265
 The House adopted the 
amendment but moments later rejected HR 4636. According to Representative Dave 
McCurdy (D-OK), moderate and Southern Democrats sided with Republicans because 
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they ―want[ed] to change policy toward El Salvador but in a ‗bipartisan‘ way, through 
negotiations with the administration.‖266  
House Democrats recovered swiftly after the defeat of HR 4636. On June 27, 
1990, the House overwhelmingly passed HR 5114, ―Foreign Assistance and Related 
Programs Appropriation, 1991,‖ with provisions identical to the Moakley-Murtha 
amendment. The release of the withheld funds was conditioned on FMLN political and 
military actions. Aid would be cut off completely based on Salvadoran government and 
military actions including an incomplete investigation of the Jesuit murders.
267
 HR 5114 
would punish both sides for not negotiating in good faith. The passage of HR 5114 
heralded a battle between the Bush administration and the Senate.   
Senior FAES officers obstructed US and Salvadoran efforts to bring the nine 
defendants to trial and uncover the extent of the conspiracy surrounding the Jesuit 
murders. In a cable to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Embassy Defense Attaché 
asserted the Jesuit case strained the Tandona because ―many officers [were] not ready to 
allow a fellow classmate [Benavides] to go to jail.‖268 The High Command, composed 
almost entirely of Tandona officers, sought to delay the Jesuit case from going to trial as 
long as possible. One example of how the FAES stalled the investigation was the 
destruction of the logbooks of entries and exits to the Military Academy on November 
                                                 
266
 John Felton, "House Fires a Warning Shot Over El Salvador Policy," May 26, 1990, CQ Weekly 
Online, http://library.cqpress.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/cqweekly/WR101409401 (accessed May 12, 
2010). 
267
 Pat Towell and Sheldon P. Yett, "House Passes Spending Bill After Shifting Priorities," June 30, 1990, 
CQ Weekly Online, http://library.cqpress.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/cqweekly/WR101409724 
(accessed May 11, 2010). 
268
 ―[Excised] Priority Tandona Politics—‗Ponce Is Not the; Tandona‘ (Bio Data),‖ February 22, 1990, El 
Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA. 
74 
 
12-16, 1989. These logbooks would have allowed the SIU to track the movement of the 
Atlacatl commando unit assigned to the Military Academy. When Judge Zamora 
requested the logbooks in March 1990, Military Academy officers responded that the 
records were misplaced but admitted in June 1990 that the logbooks had been burned 
less than a month after the murders.
269
 Whitfield attributed the military‘s lack of 
accountability for the Jesuit murders to the military-oriented El Salvador policy: 
The Salvadorans had been told that their country was on the front line for the 
fight against international communism and that the national security of the 
United States was at stake. Over the years many had, not surprisingly, come to 
believe that they were fighting and dying for the United States and that it was the 
United States that should be grateful to them. Pressure smacked of betrayal. And 
then again, the army had been threatened and pressured before, endlessly; 
experience had taught that there was nothing to fear, that fighting the war was the 
first priority and when necessary, the aid would follow.
270
 
 
This sense of institutional entitlement only made the burden of El Salvador heavier.  
 
The lack of progress in the Jesuit case frustrated the US Embassy. In an April 7 
cable to the State Department, Walker argued that ―[t]he [US Government] is the only 
institution that can turn things around. If we want a continuing and thorough 
investigation there are certain questions which have to be asked. There are people who 
have to be interrogated and the system energized to be bold and inventive. Our goal is 
not to seek a scapegoat but to require that the system function and be respected.‖271 To 
energize the investigation, Walker and Embassy staff compiled a list of twenty questions 
and four initiatives to be presented to Cristiani, Ponce, Larios, and other senior officials. 
Many of the questions focused on the events at the Military Academy on the night of 
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November 15-16. Furthermore, they also addressed rumors that Benavides was part of a 
conspiracy involving the High Command. For example, ―Was Col. Benavides authorized 
to issue orders at his own discretion or was he required to seek higher approval?‖ By 
July 1990, Walker ―believe[d] the time ha[d] come to tell Ponce as bluntly as possible 
that the present charade cannot continue.‖272 With approval from the State Department, 
Walker and Chargé d‘Affaires (Deputy Chief of Mission) William Dietrich delivered 
two demarches to Colonel Ponce on July 6 and July 19, respectively.
273
 The purpose of 
these demarches was to press Ponce and the High Command to take the initiative and 
finally resolve the case.
274
 Ponce insisted that the High Command was cooperating and 
that there was no conspiracy. 
The Bush administration did not threaten to withhold military aid until the 
August 1990 revelations of a massive conspiracy within the Salvadoran officer corps. On 
August 12, 1990, the Embassy learned from a senior military source provided by 
Moakley‘s staff delegation that on November 15 the High Command made a deliberate 
decision to kill the Jesuits. Furthermore, Ponce took credit for the decision, hundreds of 
officers knew the truth and maintained silence, and Cristiani did not act on this 
information.
275
 In response to these allegations, Walker and the Country Team 
recommended in an August 14 cable to the State Department withholding millions of 
                                                 
272
 ―Demarche to the Armed Forces,‖ July 2, 1990, El Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA. 
273
 The State Department‘s approval for the demarches is in ―Demarche to the Armed Forces,‖ July 6, 
1990, El Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA. 
274
 Walker and Dietrich‘s talking points are in ―Demarche to the Armed Forces,‖ July 2, 1990, El 
Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA. On the July 6 demarche, see ―Demarche to the Armed Forces,‖ July 2, 1990, 
El Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA. On the July 19 demarche, see ―Demarche to the Armed Forces,‖ July 27, 
1990, El Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA.   
275
 ―The Jesuit Case: Another Big Jolt,‖ August 13, 1990, El Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA. 
76 
 
dollars in remaining FY 1990 military assistance ―that [would] not greatly affect the 
ESAF‘s basic ability to fight the war but [would] cause inconvenience.‖276 Secretary 
Baker informed the Embassy in an August 17 cable that the Bush administration had 
decided to privately withhold the remaining $19 million in FY 1990 military assistance 
until the FAES cooperated actively and fully with the investigation.
277
 The $19 million 
consisted of the Foreign Military Sales of armored cars, ammunition, uniforms, and 
weapons spare parts.
278
 The administration also stated it could not support Ponce as 
Cristiani‘s choice for Minister of Defense unless he fully cooperated in the Jesuit case. 
The Embassy delivered a second set of demarches to Cristiani and the High 
Command. When Walker and Dietrich met with Cristiani on August 17, Cristiani 
insisted that he believed the military wanted to solve the murders.
279
 Accompanied by 
Colonel Menjivar, Walker presented the same talking points to the High Command on 
August 20. Walker stressed that they ―had a responsibility both moral and institutional to 
bring the truth to light. Its failure to do so was costing it supporters while fostering 
internal divisions. The damage would continue to get worse the longer [they]…refused 
to act.‖280 In response to accusations of a conspiracy, Cristiani and the entire High 
Command appeared before the Salvadoran Supreme Court on August 20 pledging to 
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cooperate with the investigation by testifying about the November 15 meeting.
281
 Ponce 
assured Walker in a private meeting that once he became Defense Minister, he would 
deal with the Jesuit case and make changes in the FAES leadership. A Defense 
Department memorandum described Ponce as ―the only person in the Salvadoran system 
capable of providing the necessary breakthrough [in the Jesuit case]… and that he must 
now choose between protecting his friends and continued funding for the ESAF.‖282 
After Cristiani named Ponce Defense Minister on September 1, however, he showed 
little initiative pursuing the truth.  
The Jesuit murders created antagonism within the Salvadoran officer corps 
toward the Tandona. Before Ponce became Defense Minister, many captains, majors, 
lieutenants, and lieutenant colonels from lower tandas criticized Ponce for not resolving 
the Jesuit case and removing corrupt Tandona officers.
283
 These actions caused 
overwhelming officer dissatisfaction because they ―[brought] the institution into 
disrepute and humiliation.‖284 According to the Embassy‘s Defense Attaché‘s interviews 
of Salvadoran officers, the officer corps believed that the Tandona was responsible for 
the decision to murder the Jesuits and the cover- up.
285
 One senior Salvadoran officer 
stated that ―[a]ny Tandona watcher should not have been surprised by this irrational, 
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murderous act. It is the fruition of years of systemic abuse and arrogance.‖286 Ponce also 
faced pressure in early October, the CIA learned, from two other tandas and 
D‘Aubuisson to resolve the Jesuit case and purge the FAES of corrupt and incompetent 
Tandona officers.
287
  
The Bush administration recognized that it would have to accept cuts in US aid 
in order to achieve a bipartisan El Salvador policy. On July 12, 1990, Aronson presented 
to House Democrats a proposal that withheld up to 15 percent of $85 million in FY 1991 
military aid for six months. The proposal also withheld another 15 percent if the FMLN 
contributed to a negotiated political settlement.
288
 Military aid would be completely cut 
if the Salvadoran government did not negotiate in good faith or if the military launched a 
coup. The proposal was developed by the State Department the previous month and had 
the support of the Defense Department and NSC staff. NSC Director for Latin American 
Affairs David A. Pacelli stated in a memorandum to Scowcroft that ―the obligations on 
the Salvadoran government are tough but not impossible. We think it is unlikely that the 
guerrillas could meet their obligations, and if they did, a 15 percent military aid drop 
would be worth it.‖289 However, House Democrats, particularly Moakley, criticized the 
                                                 
286
 ―Part 36 in Jesuit Series--ESAF ‗Graybeard‘ Talks Turkey on; Tandona and Jesuit Case,‖ August 27, 
1990, El Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA.  
287
 ―Military Pressure on the Minister of Defense to Resolve Jesuit Murder Case and Address Corruption 
in the Salvadoran Military,‖ October 3, 1990, El Salvador, 1980-1994, DNSA.  
288
 Carroll J. Doherty, "EL SALVADOR: Administration Unveils a Plan For Deal on Aid Conditions," 
July 14, 1990, CQ Weekly Online, http://library.cqpress.com.lib-
ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/cqweekly/WR101409838 (accessed May 12, 2010). 
289
 ―U.S. Military Aid to El Salvador,‖ June 15, 1990, folder El Salvador – (General) January-June 1990 
[1], William T. Pryce Files, GBPL. 
79 
 
administration‘s proposal for not cutting a higher percentage of aid and not conditioning 
a complete aid cut on progress in the Jesuit case.
290
  
In early August, Senators Dodd and Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) presented a 
proposal that capped FY 1991 military aid to El Salvador at $85 million and withheld 50 
percent of that aid. The Dodd-Leahy proposal would prohibit all military aid if the 
Salvadoran government did not meet one of five conditions including a complete 
investigation and prosecution of the Jesuit case. If the military launched a coup, all 
American economic and military assistance would be terminated. The 50 percent of 
withheld military aid would be released if the FMLN did not meet one of five 
conditions. The Dodd-Leahy proposal punished both the Salvadoran government and 
FMLN for not participating in peace negotiations or not negotiating in good faith. The 
proposal gave President Bush the ability to determine and report to Congress if the 
Salvadoran government or FMLN did not meet their five conditions.
291
  Cristiani made a 
four-day visit to Washington in September to lobby Congress to not support the aid cuts. 
His pledge to resolve the Jesuit case, however, did not sway any opinions.
292
  
The Dodd-Leahy amendment was attached to HR 5114 ―Fiscal 1991 Foreign 
Appropriations Bill/El Salvador‖ on October 10 prompting the Bush administration to 
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launch an intensive lobbying campaign in the days leading up to the vote on October 19. 
Baker, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence A. Eagleburger and Aronson made telephone 
calls and sent personal letters urging Senators to support an alternative weaker 
Republican amendment.
293
 Bush threatened to veto the bill if it contained the El 
Salvador amendment. The administration‘s lobbying efforts failed as the Senate 
overwhelming voted for the Dodd-Leahy amendment. According to Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly reporter Carroll J. Doherty, Dodd said the vote ―illustrated how ‗fed 
up‘ senators are with the ongoing violence. Leahy added that, in spite of the vote, there 
is no sympathy for the left-wing FMLN guerrillas who oppose the government. ‗The 
feeling is 'a pox on both your houses,' Leahy said.‖294 The Senate passed the final 
version of HR 5114 on October 27. Bush did not veto the bill because it contained $6.7 
billion in debt relief for Egypt, a key US ally during the Persian Gulf Crisis. The passage 
of HR 5114 demonstrated that the administration was more focused on handling a post-
Cold War foreign policy challenge than supporting the Salvadoran military.  
FMLN actions in the winter of 1990-1991 prompted the Bush administration to 
restore military aid to El Salvador. On November 20, 1990, the FMLN launched its 
largest offensive since November 1989 and introduced SA-14 surface-to-air missiles. 
In response, Walker recommended on November 26 removing the hold on the $19 
million in FY 1990 military assistance despite the fact that FAES had still not 
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cooperated fully with the murder investigation.
295
 The Bush administration accelerated 
the delivery of $48.1 million in military aid including $37.5 of the $42.5 million of FY 
1991 aid not withheld by HR 5114.
296
 On January 2, 1991, the FMLN shot down a US 
liaison helicopter carrying three US servicemen and executed the two survivors. Bush 
determined and reported to Congress that the FMLN had violated one of the five 
conditions. As a result, he authorized the release of the $42.5 million in withheld 
military aid on January 15. However, he delayed the delivery for 60 days to encourage 
peace negotiations.
297
 When the 60 days passed, Bush delayed the release again because 
he feared that the release would trigger another debate in Congress over US policy 
toward El Salvador.
298
 Embassy officials warned the Salvadoran government and 
military in January 1991 that the Bush administration and Congress would not forget 
about the Jesuit case. In a third series of demarches, they repeatedly emphasized that the 
stalled investigation had to be resolved.
299
  
When the release of withheld military aid had no effect on the investigation, 
relations between the Embassy and FAES reached a breaking point.
300
 According to 
USMILGP Commander Mark R. Hamilton, Ambassador Walker proposed in early 
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February 1991 a message ―asking State to direct him to tell Cristiani that all funds would 
be cut off if the entire Tandona did not resign within 30 days.‖301 Embassy staff 
convinced Walker to withdraw the message and send an alternate cable.  
On February 19, 1991, Ambassador Walker made his strongest condemnation of 
the FAES‘ lack of accountability for the Jesuit murders. Walker stated that since January 
1990, ―the ESAF [could not] take credit for the emergence of one new fact, one scrap of 
incriminating information.‖ He called for the removal of Ponce and other High 
Command officers, essentially the decapitation of the FAES leadership in wartime, for 
the mishandling of the Jesuit case. In contrast to his August 14, 1990 cable, Walker 
recommended the Bush administration freeze high priority requests for AH-1 Cobra 
helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and place heavy conditions dependent on the 
progress of the Jesuit case investigation on FY 1992 military assistance. The cable ended 
with Walker stating that supporting the FAES was incompatible with the policy 
objective of a negotiated political settlement.
302
  
The High Command made a weak attempt at resolving the Jesuit case. In a 
February 22, 1991 letter to Justice Minister René Hernández Valiente, Ponce and four 
High Command officers offered to assist the SIU by providing several investigative 
initiatives.
303
 They continue to stress that there was no institutional responsibility for the 
murders and cover-up. Walker welcomed the letter but remarked it was ―the first time 
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any GOES/ESAF official has admitted that ‗others [officers and soldiers other than the 
nine defendants] were involved.‘‖304 However, interviews conducted with officers 
mentioned in the February 22 letter produced no new information.
305
 The CIA stated in 
an April 10, 1991 commentary that the letter ―served to delay the case from going to 
trial, muddied the already murky waters and generated both hope and despair that a just 
solution [would] be found.‖306 In April 1991, the Bush administration decided that it 
would use the available $42.5 million in military aid to fund only nonlethal sustainment 
items such as medical supplies and field rations. These items would be reviewed and 
their delivery delayed or halted based on three conditions: progress in the Jesuit case, 
progress in the peace negotiations, and El Salvador‘s security situation, and in that 
order.
307
 The administration had imposed the same conditions on military aid that it had 
opposed for over a year. Human rights promotion had trumped security interests. El 
Salvador had ceased to be the ―Israel of Central America.‖  
After nearly two years of pre-trial proceedings and military obstructionism, the 
Jesuit murder trial began on September 26, 1991 before the Salvadoran Supreme Court. 
The trial lasted only two days. The jury found Benavides guilty of eight counts of 
murder, instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism and Lieutenant Yusshy 
René Mendoza guilty of one murder count. They were sentenced in January 1992 to 30 
years in prison. For the first time in Salvadoran history, a senior military officer was 
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found guilty of a human rights violation. However, the seven other officers and enlisted 
men, the actual triggermen, were acquitted of all murder charges despite their 
confessions and physical evidence. Three officers were found guilty of lesser charges 
and were sentenced to three years in prison.
308
 On November 18, 1991, Moakley issued a 
statement alleging that former Defense Minister General Bustillo, Ponce, and the High 
Command met in the afternoon of November 15, 1989, decided to kill the Jesuits, and 
gave the order to Benavides. The Embassy regarded this accusation as ―informed 
speculation.‖309 The Bush administration‘s final report on the Jesuit murders concluded 
that ―there is no evidence that Benavides consulted with other officers from his academy 
year group (tanda) about the murders or that he received orders from anyone to carry out 
the murders.‖ In addition, the alleged November 15 meeting of the High Command 
―hinged on unsubstantiated information.‖310 The United Nations Commission on the 
Truth of El Salvador declared in its March 1993 report on human rights violations that 
―[t]here is substantial evidence that on the night of 15 November 1989…Ponce, in the 
presence of and in collusion with…Bustillo [and four other colonels, three of whom 
were Tandona members] gave…Benavides the order to kill Father Ignacio Ellacuria and 
to leave no witnesses.‖311 The Bush administration spent nearly two years demanding a 
full investigation of the Jesuit case by pressuring the same individual who may have 
ordered the murders.  
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To remove El Salvador from the foreign policy agenda, the Bush administration 
gradually became a more forceful advocate of human rights in El Salvador than either 
the Carter or Reagan administrations. However, human rights promotion conflicted with 
the policy of democracy promotion. Supporting Salvadoran democracy meant providing 
the FAES with the weapons and training to fight the FMLN. Although the Salvadoran 
civil war was not a vital national security issue, the Bush administration opposed 
attempts by Congress to significantly cut military aid to El Salvador. Though it was 
willing to condition, albeit secretly, the release of withheld military assistance on 
progress on the Jesuit case.   
The Jesuit case represented the near complete failure of the new case theory of 
human rights violations. Bush administration officials, the US Embassy, and 
SOUTHCOM repeatedly and forcefully argued to the FAES that failing to resolve the 
Jesuit case would galvanize Democrats and Republicans in Congress to cut military aid. 
Yet, Colonel Ponce and his Tandona classmates in the High Command delayed the case 
from going to trial as long as possible. Military obstructionism kept El Salvador on the 
foreign policy agenda for nearly two years. Although Benavides and Mendoza were 
found guilty of murder, the actual killers and possible planners were not.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE SALVADORAN PEACE PROCESS 
 
The Bush administration supported the UN-mediated peace process to end the 
Salvadoran civil war as soon as possible and to remove the burden of El Salvador from 
the foreign policy agenda. Even before the UN intervened in December 1989 to bring an 
end to the war, the Bush administration expressed its support for peace negotiations. The 
FMLN sent President-elect George Bush a letter on December 8, 1988 requesting to hold 
private conversations with US representatives to discuss ―a prompt political solution‖ to 
the war.
312
 These talks would complement renewed dialogue between the FMLN and 
Salvadoran government. The State Department, according to former Foreign Service 
Officer Todd Greentree, sent a positive reply to the initiative.
313
  
On January 23, 1989, the FMLN offered to participate in the coming presidential 
election if they were postponed from March to September. After the postponed elections, 
the FMLN would negotiate a cease-fire.
314
 The State Department publicly stated that the 
proposal was ''‗worthy of serious and substantive consideration, which it [was] 
receiving.‘''315 However, acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
Michael Kozak argued in a February 9 cable to Secretary Baker that the peace proposal 
was ―a propaganda ploy [because the FMLN]…ha[d] not dropped their earlier demands 
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for power sharing outside of elections and the integration of guerrilla combatants into the 
army.‖316 When both parties rejected proposals and counter-proposals for a cease-fire in 
late February and early March, the FMLN boycotted and disrupted the election.
317
 
Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani fulfilled a campaign promise by pledging 
to restart negotiations with the FMLN in his inaugural speech on June 1, 1989. He 
recognized that the Salvadoran public was tired of the war and wanted it to end.
318
 Peace 
talks, arranged by the Catholic Church and observed by the UN and OAS, resumed 
between the Salvadoran government and the guerrillas in September and October 1989 
in Mexico and Costa Rica, respectively. Negotiations resulted in no breakthrough as the 
guerrillas rejected the government‘s proposal for an immediate cease-fire. The FMLN 
withdrew from negotiations after unknown persons bombed the offices of two leftist 
organizations with links to the guerrillas on October 31.
319
 Less than two weeks later, the 
FMLN launched its offensive in San Salvador.  
Military stalemate motivated the FMLN and the Salvadoran government to seek 
a political solution under UN auspices. The failure of the November 1989 offensive to 
inspire a popular insurrection demonstrated that the FMLN did not have the support of 
the Salvadoran people.  The FMLN‘s five factions argued over the utility of armed 
struggle compared to peace negotiations. They feared that they would be perceived as 
militarily weak if they negotiated. However, they soon realized that peace negotiations 
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could accomplish the same political objectives as armed struggle, most importantly, the 
dissolution of the FAES.
320
 UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar assigned Alvaro de 
Soto, a fellow Peruvian diplomat, as his Special Representative for El Salvador. De Soto 
would be responsible for mediating a nearly two-year long peace process. The FMLN 
reached out to the UN in late November as it was simultaneously fighting for control of 
San Salvador. A FMLN diplomatic commission, led by Salvador Samayoa, arranged a 
secret December 8 meeting with de Soto in Montreal, Canada. Unlike the comandantes, 
Samayoa supported a UN role in ending the civil war. The comandantes were suspicious 
of the UN‘s impartiality and remained committed to a military solution. De Soto assured 
the FMLN commission that the UN would be an impartial mediator.
321
 As a result, the 
FMLN accepted UN mediation of peace negotiations on December 18.
322
 
The Salvadoran government approached the UN publicly and privately. At a 
summit in San Isidro de Coronado, Costa Rica summit on December 12 1989, five 
Central American presidents including Cristiani and Daniel Ortega signed a declaration 
―request[ing] respectfully the Secretary-General of the United Nations to do everything 
within his power to take the necessary steps to ensure the resumption of dialogue [in El 
Salvador]…, thereby facilitating its successful continuation.‖ Cristiani recognized that 
dialogue with the FMLN was critical to domestic and international perceptions of the 
Salvadoran government and maintaining US aid. With pressure from the Bush 
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administration, he formally requested Pérez de Cuéllar‘s help on January 31 to end the 
war. The US also pressured the Salvadoran military to accept UN involvement in the 
peace process.
323
 However, Cristiani considered the UN an intermediary not a mediator 
because he insisted, according to historian Diana Villiers Negroponte, that ―the 
Salvadoran protagonists would find a solution to their own national problems.‖324 He 
also called for dialogue not negotiations because negotiations legitimized the FMLN as 
equal to the Salvadoran government.
325
    
 For the next eight weeks, de Soto conducted shuttle diplomacy between the five 
FMLN comandantes and the Salvadoran government to establish the procedure for the 
peace process. Both parties disagreed over the format with the government favoring 
direct talks and FMLN pushing for UN mediation.
326
 A compromise allowed the UN to 
use either method at each stage to ensure continuous negotiations. According to de Soto, 
most of the peace process was negotiated using the single negotiating text technique: 
―consulting with the parties on each issue and subsequently submitting a text to them, as 
far as possible simultaneously, and then discussing it with each of them separately and 
revising it in light of their reactions so as to narrow down differences, repeating the 
exercise as many times as necessary.‖327 On March 27, the two parties secretly met in 
Mexico City for the first time since October 1989 to resolve the remaining differences 
over the procedure.
328
 They publicly signed the agreed framework for negotiations on 
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April 4, 1990 in Geneva, Switzerland. The purpose of the peace process, according to 
the Geneva Agreement, was ―to end the armed conflict by political means as speedily as 
possible, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for 
human rights and reunify Salvadorian society.‖329 
Before mediating the end of the Salvadoran civil war, the United Nations had 
helped end the war between the Sandinista government and the Contras in Nicaragua. 
The Contadora Group worked with the UN to develop a mechanism for the 
implementation of Esquipulas II.  At a February 1989 summit in Costa de Sol, El 
Salvador, the Sandinista government agreed to free and general elections on February 
25, 1990 in exchange for the demobilization of the Contras. On July 27, 1989, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 637 which offered the full support of the Secretary-
General to the Esquipulas II process.  The UN deployed a peacekeeping force to Central 
America in December 1989 to verify Esquipulas II compliance and to monitor the 
February 1990 elections and Contra demobilization.
330
 In the presidential election, 
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the candidate for an anti-Sandinista coalition, defeated 
incumbent Daniel Ortega.
331
 For the first time since July 1979, the Sandinistas were out 
of power. After signing a cease-fire and demobilization agreement in April 1990, the last 
Contras demobilized in July.
332
  
Unlike the Reagan administration, the Bush administration was willing to 
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cooperate with the UN on regional and global issues. Pérez de Cuéllar summarized the 
Reagan administration‘s attitude toward the UN as ―an ideological distrust of the United 
Nations as an organization where democracies faced a hostile majority of communist 
and dictatorial regimes. In this view, the greater authority the United Nations had, the 
greater the influence of these undemocratic forces in the world.‖333 By the end of 1986, 
the UN faced bankruptcy because the Reagan administration was withholding US 
contributions to the UN budget.
334
 For Pérez de Cuéllar, the US vote for Security 
Council Resolution 637 in July 1989 was a turning point of US policy toward Central 
America. The US had accepted for the first time a UN role in ending Central America‘s 
civil wars.
335
   
The Bush administration‘s acceptance of UN mediation of the Salvadoran peace 
process reflected the US-UN relationship in the post-Cold War era. Bush recognized that 
international institutions like the UN could be used to carry out American foreign policy 
goals.
336
 Bush‘s own experience as US Permanent Representative to the UN from 1971 
to 1973 and as head of the United States Liaison Office in China from 1974 to 1975 
shaped his diplomatic style and his administration‘s successful relationship with the 
institution.
337
 His commitment to personal diplomacy was developed in New York and 
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in Beijing. Seymour Maxwell Finger, Bush‘s former advisor at the UN, attributed the 
Bush administration‘s successful relationship with the UN to the performance of 
Permanent Representative, Ambassador Thomas Pickering.
338
 The former Ambassador 
to El Salvador from 1983 to 1985, Pickering was a career Foreign Service Officer who 
unlike previous Permanent Representatives was not a Cabinet member. Pickering would 
play a key role in facilitating the Salvadoran peace process and resolving differences 
between the Bush administration and the UN.  
 Starting in January 1990, the Bush administration fully supported Cristiani and a 
negotiated political settlement to end the Salvadoran civil war. Secretary Baker outlined 
the administration‘s approach to both sides of the peace process: ―On the one hand, we 
had to signal to the Salvadoran military that they must support a negotiated peace-and a 
purge of human-rights violators-or risk losing U.S. support. On the other, we had to 
convince hard-line factions among the guerrillas that if they continued the war, the 
United States would not abandon El Salvador.‖339 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs Joseph G. Sullivan stated that the goal of US involvement in 
the peace process was to end the war as soon as possible.
340
 The faster a comprehensive 
peace agreement was reached, the faster the administration could shift its attention from 
El Salvador to other foreign policy agenda items. To achieve this objective, the 
administration pushed the Salvadoran government to take an open and flexible stance 
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and relied on the UN and other third parties to pressure the FMLN to negotiate in good 
faith. Cristiani and his team of negotiators faced intense pressure throughout the peace 
process from the right wing of ARENA and the FAES to compromise as little as possible 
on all issues. According to political economist Tricia Juhn, a pervasive fear during peace 
negotiations was that the High Command would overthrow Cristiani.
341
 The 
administration‘s public and private statements in support of Cristiani made it clear to the 
Salvadoran officer corps and rightist extremists, according to Negroponte, that the 
administration ―would not tolerate any move to get rid of, or murder [Cristiani].‖342  
The Bush administration fully supported the peace process to prevent Congress 
from cutting US aid to El Salvador. As discussed in the previous chapter, Congress 
sought to condition US aid on progress in peace negotiations. According to Assistant 
Secretary Aronson, the US was committed to both a political solution and the security of 
the Salvadoran government.
343
 In a Washington Post editorial aimed at influencing the 
vote for HR 5114 on October 19, Aronson argued for a bipartisan El Salvador policy that 
cut aid to punish government and guerrilla human rights abusers but not to the extent 
that it undermined El Salvador‘s security. This policy would send the following message 
to all sides of the civil war: ―It is time to end the war through negotiations; the search for 
military victory by either side is a formula for endless destruction and suffering. Peace 
requires not just the absence of war, but safe political space and personal security for all 
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Salvadorans and civilian control over the military must exist in fact as well as in 
name.‖344 Aronson‘s statement represents the fundamental difference between the 
Reagan and Bush administrations. In contrast to the Reagan administration‘s emphasis 
on military victory over the insurgents, the objective of the Bush administration‘s El 
Salvador policy had become a negotiated political settlement with concessions from the 
Salvadoran government and the FMLN.
345
  
The May 1990 talks in Caracas, Venezuela focused on establishing the agenda 
and schedule for negotiations. The Caracas Agreement, signed on May 21, outlined a 
two-phase process. During the first phase, both parties would reach political agreements 
on the armed forces, human rights, electoral system, judicial system, constitutional 
reform, economic and social issues, and UN verification before a cease-fire was 
negotiated.  The target date for the completion of the first phase was September 15, 
1990. The second phase would focus on the reintegration of FMLN members into post-
war Salvadoran society and the implementation of the political agreements.
346
  
Negotiations stalled in June and July 1990 over issues regarding the armed 
forces. The negotiating team assembled by Cristiani rejected demands such as a purge of 
the FAES officer corps and the end of military impunity. However, it was willing to 
segregate the public security forces from the FAES.
347
 With no progress on armed forces 
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issues, government and guerrilla negotiators shifted their attention to human rights. The 
first major breakthrough of the peace process, the signing of the San José Agreement on 
Human Rights, occurred in San José, Costa Rica on July 26, 1990. The San José 
Agreement called for the full guarantee of human rights and the end of violations.
348
  
Both parties agreed to allow a UN verification mission to investigate human rights 
violations and promote and defend human rights in El Salvador. The UN human rights 
verification mission known as the Misión de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en El 
Salvador (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador) was established in Security 
Council Resolution 693 on May 20, 1991. ONUSAL was launched on July 26, 1991 in 
San Salvador and on October 1, 1991, began investigating alleged human rights 
violations with the cooperation of the Salvadoran government, military, and FMLN.
349
  
 Following the San José Agreement, the peace process stalemated again in August 
and September 1990 over armed forces issues. The Salvadoran government rejected the 
FMLN demand for the dissolution of the FAES but offered concessions in a 33-point 
proposal. These included the dissolution of the Atlacatl BIRI.
350
 As a result of 
fundamental differences over armed forces issues, both sides deserve blame for missing 
the objective of a cease-fire by September 15 as set by the Caracas Agreement.  
To move negotiations forward, Pérez de Cuéllar invited the nations of Colombia, 
Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela in late September to form the ―Group of Friends of the 
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Secretary-General for El Salvador‖ also known as the ―Four Friends.‖351 The purpose of 
the Group of Friends was to support the Secretary-General by pressuring both parties 
reach a negotiated political settlement. Except Spain, the Group of Friends was the 
original Contadora Group members. However, unlike the Contadora and Esquipulas 
processes, Pérez de Cuéllar excluded Central American nations to maintain 
impartiality.
352
 Spain, the only European country, was included because it maintained 
good relations with the region and could place additional pressure on the Salvadoran 
government to control the FAES since five of the six Jesuit priests murdered on 
November 16, 1989 were Spaniards. Since the US had the greatest leverage on the 
Salvadoran government and military, the group was referred to, according to Venezuelan 
diplomat Diego Arria, as ―The Four Plus One.‖353  
 Until September 1990, the Bush administration had played a minimal role in the 
peace process. The failure to achieve a cease-fire by September 15, 1990, however, 
provoked strong criticism of de Soto‘s mediation by the Bush administration. On 
September 29, 1990, Aronson, Pickering, and NSC Special Assistant to the President 
and Senior Director on Latin American Affairs William T. Pryce met with de Soto and 
his team at UN headquarters to express the administration‘s frustration with the slow 
pace of peace talks. The US officials emphasized that de Soto and Pérez de Cuéllar were 
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not fully using the power they had over negotiations. By not punishing the FMLN for its 
lack of cooperation, they argued, de Soto and Pérez de Cuéllar were perceived by the 
FAES and ARENA as sympathetic to the FMLN. To break the stalemate, they 
recommended a more active role for the UN, more concessions from the FMLN, and to 
―let the side that refuses to cooperate bear the public responsibility.‖354 De Soto 
attributed the Bush administration‘s criticism to ―a reluctance to accept the consequences 
of the mediation having been entrusted to a genuinely impartial good officer, and the 
corollary that he could not unilaterally move the goalposts.‖355 The date September 15, 
de Soto argued, was interpreted incorrectly as a deadline by the administration which 
was seeking a cease-fire to prevent Congress from cutting US aid to El Salvador.
356
 He 
stated that imposing deadlines or punishing either party for intransigence would have 
undermined his credibility as an impartial mediator.
357
  
 De Soto‘s working paper on military reform broke the logjam in the peace 
process. Presented to both parties in secret ―working group‖ meetings on October 29-31, 
1990 in Mexico, the working paper proposed measures such as a new civilian national 
police force that assumed the responsibilities of the National Guard and the Treasury 
Police, the dissolution of the BIRIs, and stronger civilian authority.
358
 Most importantly, 
the working paper proposed a process known as depuración (purification), the purging 
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of the officer corps by a three-person ad-hoc commission. Despite objections from both 
parties, de Soto‘s working paper was accepted as a basis for further discussions.  
Negotiations between November 1990 and March 1991 focused on armed forces 
issues but failed to produce a breakthrough. When the FMLN‘s November 1990 
offensive threatened to wreck the peace process, Pérez de Cuéllar appealed for restraint 
on both sides and instructed de Soto to intensify negotiations.
359
 Instead of boycotting 
the March 1991 Legislative Assembly elections, the FMLN participated by supporting 
leftist parties to end ARENA‘s majority. According to Juhn, the FMLN delayed any 
major breakthrough in negotiations until after the elections in order to prevent ARENA 
from gaining any electoral advantage.
360
  
 In January 1991, Ambassador Walker proposed a series of diplomatic initiatives 
to accelerate and intensify negotiations. The purpose of this ―diplomatic offensive‖ was 
to create a ―pressure cooker‖ to achieve a cease-fire agreement before the March 1991 
elections. Walker recommended initiatives that would convince Pérez de Cuéllar ―that 
there [was] significant international pressure on him for the negotiations to produce 
results in the shortest possible time.‖361 Cristiani responded favorably to the 
recommendations in a meeting with Walker on January 20 but for unknown reasons, he 
did not carry out the diplomatic offensive.
362
  De Soto rejected the State Department‘s 
insistence on pressure-cooker negotiations because he believed they ―would have been 
                                                 
359
Pilgrimage for Peace, 424-425. 
360
 Juhn, Negotiating Peace in El Salvador, 85-87. 
361
 ―Suggestions for GOES Strategy to Generate International Pressure on US for Salvadoran Negotiations, 
January 19, 1991, folder El Salvador – January 1991-March 1991 [4], Charles A. Gillespie Files, GBPL. 
362
 ―Ambassador Presents US Suggestions on GOES Military Proposal, Diplomatic Offensive Leading to 
Pressure Cooker Negotiations,‖ January 20, 1991, folder El Salvador – January 1991-March 1991 [3], 
Charles A. Gillespie Files, GBPL.  
99 
 
of little usefulness until the proper conditions existed…My critics did not understand 
that-as Pedro Nikken [a Venezuelan lawyer on de Soto‘s team] so aptly put it-fruit does 
not ripen by being thrown against the wall.‖363  
 The transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era had a moderating 
influence on the FMLN. The loss of political and military support from its key allies 
forced the insurgency to reevaluate its ideology. Violeta Chamorro‘s victory in the 
February 1990 Nicaraguan presidential election severed the links between the FMLN 
and the Sandinistas. The Chamorro government had to end arms shipments to El 
Salvador to maintain compliance with Esquipulas II. In an attempt to normalize relations 
with the US, Cuba ended material support for the FMLN in February 1991.
364
 Although 
the Sandinista-controlled Nicaraguan military circumvented President Chamorro by 
continuing to sending weapons months after the election, the FMLN had recognized the 
reality of the new post-Cold War era international system. A March 22, 1991 CIA report 
asserted that by March 1991, the FMLN had shifted from using armed struggle to 
achieve a Marxist-Leninist state to using negotiations to reach its new goal of a 
pluralistic democracy.
365
 ERP comandante Joaquín Villalobos was considered the most 
radical FMLN comandante during the war but in March 1991 he described orthodox 
Communism as an extreme ideology. He sought to model El Salvador‘s future on 
capitalist countries such as Costa Rica.
366
 This ideological reorientation partly explains 
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why the FMLN, for the first time, participated albeit indirectly in the democratic process 
in March 1991. Also, the situation in El Salvador in 1991 was no longer as dangerous for 
the guerrillas as it was in the 1980s.  
Following the Malta summit, the US and Soviet Union cooperated to end the 
Salvadoran civil war. The two superpowers agreed at the summit at Camp David, 
Maryland on June 1, 1990 to support a negotiated political settlement in El Salvador and 
recognized that Cuban support for the FMLN hindered the peace process.
367
 Bush and 
Baker continued to urge the Soviets to convince the Cuban government to end arms 
shipments to the FMLN. In exchange, the US offered to improve relations with Cuba.
368
 
Through its contacts with the PCES (Communist Party of El Salvador), the Soviet Union 
pressured the FMLN to agree to a comprehensive peace agreement.
369
  However, de Soto 
contended that the Bush administration placed too much emphasis on Soviet support for 
the peace process. PCES comandante Schafik Handal told de Soto that the Soviet Union 
had no leverage to exercise on the FMLN.
370
 Also, the PCES was the least influential of 
the five FMLN factions.  
Starting in June 1989, the Bush administration had offered to allow Cuba to play 
a constructive role in the Central American peace process. When Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Cuba in early October 1989, Castro told him that 
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the supported a political solution to the Salvadoran civil war and was willing to end arms 
shipments to Central America if the US did the same.
371
 Castro also stated, according to 
Yuri Pavlov, that as long as the US provided military assistance to the Salvadoran 
government, ―Cuba had a moral right to render assistance to the FMLN forces when 
necessary and would not accept any unilateral obligation that would limit this right.‖372 
Baker, Pickering, and the US Interests Section in Havana, Cuba made offers but the 
Cuban government refused to participate in negotiations.
373
 Pavlov argued that US-
Soviet cooperation failed to pressure Cuba to participate in the Salvadoran peace process 
because both superpowers had opposing objectives. The Soviet Union sought to preserve 
its alliance with Cuba despite attempts by the US to end it. The US was unwilling to 
make serious concessions such as cutting all military aid to El Salvador to normalize 
relations with Cuba. Attempts at tripartite dialogue between the US, the Soviet Union, 
and Cuba ended in failure.
374
  
Negotiations in Mexico City in April 1991 focused on amending the 1983 
Salvadoran Constitution to incorporate political agreements affecting Salvadoran 
government and military institutions. However, a constitutional deadline threatened to 
set back the entire peace process. Article 248 of the Salvadoran Constitution required 
that constitutional amendments be approved by two consecutive Legislative Assemblies. 
The Legislative Assembly would be replaced after April 30 by incoming members. If the 
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Salvadoran government and FMLN did not agree on constitutional amendments before 
April 30, they would have to wait until the 1994 Legislative Assembly elections. The 
FMLN, supported by de Soto, pushed for reforming Article 248 by allowing any 
amendment to be approved by a single assembly. Cristiani, supported by the Bush 
administration and the Group of Friends, made it clear that the Salvadoran government 
opposed reforming Article 248. He regarded Article 248 reform as an attempt by the 
FMLN to delay negotiations.
375
  Subsequently, the FMLN dropped the demand.  
On April 27, 1991, both parties agreed to constitutional reforms regarding the 
armed forces, judicial system and human rights, and the electoral system. The 
Legislative Assembly approved the amendments on April 29-30. The most significant 
aspects of the Mexico Agreements included stronger civilian control of the armed forces, 
the creation of the Policía Nacional Civil (National Civilian Police or PNC), an 
independent judiciary, and a new administrative body for electoral matters.
376
 The 
parties also agreed to the establishment of a Commission on the Truth composed of three 
Secretary-General-appointed individuals to investigate ―serious acts of violence that 
have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently requires that the public 
should know the truth.‖377 The Truth Commission would be part of a process to promote 
national reconciliation.   
                                                 
375
 Juhn, Negotiating Peace in El Salvador, 88. ―GOES – FMLN Negotiations: GOES Position on Article 
248,‖ April 19, 1991, folder El Salvador – April-June 1991 [4], Latin American Directorate Files, GBPL. 
376
 With the creation of the PNC, the Mexico Agreements separated public security forces from the FAES. 
The United Nations and El Salvador, 167-174. 
377
 The United Nations and El Salvador, 168. 
103 
 
Negotiations during the summer of 1991 stalemated over how to handle the 
―Gordian knot,‖ a term that referred to the dilemma imposed by the Caracas timetable.378 
According to former UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Marrack 
Goulding, the Caracas Agreement made arrangements for a cease-fire nearly impossible: 
―The government‘s primary objective was an end to the war and demobilization of the 
FMLN…But agreement to end the conflict was the only card in the FMLN‘s hand; they 
would not play it until the government had committed itself to a [series of fundamental 
reforms].‖379 The Gordian knot was untied when both sides agreed in August to 
compress the peace process into one phase rather than two as outlined in the Caracas 
Agreement. Now, both sides would reach agreements on all issues before a cease-fire 
was declared.
380
 The details on the cease-fire were delayed until the final negotiation 
sessions in December 1991.  
During the summer of 1991, the Bush administration and the Group of Friends 
pressed both parties and the UN to make greater progress in the negotiations. President 
Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela nearly undermined the peace process when he 
summoned government and guerrilla negotiators to Caracas in early July without 
consulting de Soto.
381
 At the first Ibero-American Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico on 
July 18-19, the Group of Friends urged both parties to increase the pace of 
negotiations.
382
 Baker and new Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh issued 
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a joint letter on August 1, 1991, urging Pérez de Cuéllar to take personal leadership of 
the peace process. For both superpowers, the unresolved Salvadoran civil war was a 
barrier to the post-Cold War era of peace and economic development in Latin 
America.
383
 To reenergize the peace process, Pérez de Cuéllar invited Cristiani and the 
five FMLN comandantes to UN Headquarters in New York on September 16-17. For the 
first time, negotiations to end the Salvadoran civil war took place in the US. Ambassador 
Pickering ensured that the US issued visas for the comandantes.
384
 
Along with an agreement on a compressed agenda, both sides signed the New 
York Agreement on September 25, 1991.
385
 This agreement established the Comisión 
Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz (National Commission for the Consolidation 
of Peace or COPAZ). Composed of government, military, FMLN, and political party 
representatives, COPAZ would oversee the implementation of the peace agreements. 
The New York Agreement reduced the size of the FAES and established an ad hoc 
commission to purify the armed forces by investigating all FAES officers and removing 
those who have committed illegal acts. Both parties agreed that former guerrillas could 
join the PNC but not the FAES and that the FMLN could no longer demand the 
dissolution of the FAES.
386
 The function of the FAES was redefined from internal 
security to defending national sovereignty and territory. For the first time, both sides 
discussed social and economic issues. They agreed to give land in excess of 245 hectares 
to landless peasants and small farmers.  
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 Throughout the peace process, the UN, the Group of Friends, and the Soviet 
Union urged the Bush administration to directly contact the FMLN. Since 1980, the US 
had refused to directly contact and negotiate with the guerrillas and insisted that 
negotiations take place between Salvadorans. Since the Bush administration refused to 
talk to the FMLN, it relied on de Soto to present the FMLN‘s views. De Soto argued that 
this arrangement contributed to the misperception that he favored the FMLN.
387
  
Bush‘s officials reevaluated the policy on contacts with the FMLN after the 
September 15, 1990 target date for a cease-fire passed. An October 20, 1990 Embassy 
cable to Baker described how the US government would directly contact the FMLN after 
it made major concessions: publicly renouncing attacks against the Salvadoran 
infrastructure and assassinations of civilian and military officials, not launching a second 
offensive, and conditioning direct contact on a serious FMLN effort in the peace process. 
Discussions with the FMLN would not involve the Ambassador or other high-ranking 
Embassy officials. The Embassy would present the Bush administration‘s positions on 
the negotiating process and consult with the Salvadoran government before and after 
each meeting. Walker and the Country Team commented that ―if played just right, the 
FMLN could end up with severe irreversible restrictions in their modus operandi…Let‘s 
go for it.‖388  
 After receiving approval from Baker on January 1, 1991, the State Department 
carried out both secret and public meetings with the FMLN. Peter Romero, the State 
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Department‘s Salvadoran Desk Officer, had the first direct meeting with Resistencia 
Nacional representatives in Mexico City in January despite the fact that the FMLN did 
not make any of the major concessions described in the October 20, 1990 cable.
389
 
During his second trip to El Salvador in late June 1991, Congressman Joe Moakley 
wanted to see living conditions outside San Salvador. Walker accompanied Moakley to 
Santa Marta, a pro-FMLN town near the border with Honduras consisting of refugees 
who had fled the death squads and the fighting, to listen to the town leaders‘ concerns 
about government services and military repression. The US delegation provided gifts 
such as children‘s coloring books and Gillette razors for the adults.390 Walker returned to 
Santa Marta with USMILGP Commander Colonel Hamilton, on August 31, 1991. They 
met with the town‘s leaders and RN comandante Raúl Hercules, conversed with teenage 
guerrillas and later posed for pictures with them.
391
 During negotiations in September 
1991, RN deputy comandante Roberto Cañas requested a meeting with Joseph Sullivan 
to discuss a FMLN proposal for a one-year truce and a mechanism to establish civilian 
control of the FAES. According to a US Permanent Mission to the UN cable to the State 
Department, Sullivan and Pickering denied the request for a meeting and the Salvadoran 
government rejected the proposal. However, Pickering did not rule out further discussion 
with the FMLN during the negotiation sessions: ―it was obvious that the FMLN wanted 
the meeting very badly and that it should therefore have to pay a price for it. The 
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meeting idea could be left on hold for now. It could be cashed in later for something 
important that the GOES wanted.‖392  
Negotiators faced the daunting objective of reaching a comprehensive peace 
agreement before the end of Pérez de Cuéllar‘s second term as Secretary-General on 
December 31, 1991. His successor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, stated that the Salvadoran 
peace process would have low priority during his tenure.
393
 As a result, the UN, the Bush 
administration, and the Group of Friends, aggressively pressed both sides to reach a 
definitive agreement by December 31. Fighting between the FAES and FMLN stopped 
as the deadline approached. In response to a six-day truce announced by the FMLN, the 
Salvadoran government stopped aerial and artillery strikes in late November.
394
 The 
State Department and US Embassy discussed the possibility of a bilateral meeting with 
the FMLN.  An October 29 Embassy cable contended that such a meeting would assure 
the FMLN that the Salvadoran government would respect a comprehensive peace 
agreement.
395
  Cristiani told Walker on December 19 that he believed a US-FMLN 
meeting could help break the stalemate over unresolved issues.
396
 Although high-ranking 
Bush administration officials were present during the final negotiations in New York, it 
is unknown if they directly contacted the guerrillas. 
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The final round of negotiations began on December 16 but stalemated over 
numerous issues most importantly, the integration of former insurgents into the PNC and 
cease-fire arrangements.
397
 Starting on December 25, Goulding led cease-fire talks. After 
reaching an agreement on the structure and time of the formal cease-fire, Goulding 
imposed a decision on December 31 on the locations where FAES and FMLN forces 
would be stationed for demobilization.
398
 Urged by Pérez de Cuéllar, Cristiani arrived in 
New York on December 28 to ensure that a peace agreement was reached. According to 
Negroponte, de Soto abandoned the single negotiating text technique and imposed 
agreements on unresolved issues.
399
 Pérez de Cuéllar nearly left New York in the 
afternoon of December 31 but stayed to pressure both sides to make compromises.
400
  
At four minutes before midnight on December 31, 1991, both parties signed the 
New York Act which contained definitive agreements ―on all technical and military 
aspects relating to the separation of the warring parties and the cessation of the armed 
conflict.‖401 The cease-fire would take effect on February 1, 1992 and the war would end 
on October 31, 1992. New York Act II was signed on January 13 after meetings in early 
January had resolved all remaining issues including the timetable for implementing the 
agreements and the reintegration of the FMLN.  In a ceremony attended by many Latin 
American leaders, Boutros-Ghali, and Secretary Baker, the Salvadoran government and 
FMLN signed the Peace Agreement in Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on January 
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16, 1992. The Chapultepec Accords encapsulated every agreement made between both 
parties since April 1990. De Soto stated that the peace agreement constituted a 
―negotiated revolution‖ in El Salvador.402  
On January 1, 1992, Aronson and Colonel Hamilton met with all five FMLN 
comandantes in Roberto Cañas‘ New York hotel room. For the first time, an Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs had directly contacted the guerrillas. 
Aronson stated that ―I felt it would be useful to tell them to their faces that we wanted to 
make peace and supported the accords…And that we didn‘t just view them as a 
necessary evil to end the war, that we believed in the reforms that had been 
negotiated.‖403 In a scene that would have been unimaginable during the Reagan 
administration, the US had accepted the presence of the FMLN in post-war Salvadoran 
society. By making peace with the FMLN, the Bush administration had lifted the burden 
of US policy toward El Salvador.  
The Chapultepec Accords ended the protection racket state by establishing 
civilian control and supervision of the military. El Salvador‘s President now could 
appoint civilian Defense Ministers and had authority over a new independent 
intelligence agency. After reaching a high of more than 60,000 personnel during the war, 
the FAES was reduced to less than 30,000, a size appropriate for national defense. The 
peace accords also included the depuración of the officer corps by an ad-hoc 
commission, the disbanding of the BIRIs and paramilitary units, and the end of military 
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impunity. The institutional autonomy of the Salvadoran military and public security 
forces that had been in place since 1931 was over. 
El Salvador ceased to be a burden for the Bush administration after January 16, 
1992. The Cold War was over and the Salvadoran government and FMLN had achieved 
a cease-fire. The administration pledged support for the reconstruction of post-war El 
Salvador but the era of constant US intervention in Salvadoran affairs had ended. The 
Bush administration requested nearly $300 million in US aid to El Salvador for FY 1993 
but in October 1992, Congress limited the request to $228.4 million including $45 
million in development aid, $110 million in Economic Support Funds, and $11 million 
in non-lethal US military aid.
404
 During this critical and potential volatile period in 
Salvadoran history, the US had no ambassador in El Salvador. William Walker served as 
ambassador until February 1992 but he was not replaced until September 1993. Senator 
Dodd and Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) blocked Bush‘s nominations for ambassadors to 
El Salvador and Nicaragua, Michael Kozak and Joseph Sullivan, respectively. The two 
Senators wanted to know what Kozak and Sullivan knew about the Bush 
administration‘s covert support for Violeta Chamorro‘s presidential campaign in 
Nicaragua.
405
 Peter Romero stepped in as the Deputy Chief of Mission in July 1992 and 
remained in El Salvador until Alan Flanigan was appointed ambassador.
406
   
Difficulties in demilitarizing Salvadoran society stalled the implementation of the 
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Chapultepec Accords. Both the Salvadoran government and FMLN were not upholding 
the cease-fire agreements. The FMLN was delaying demobilization and the government 
was slow in dismantling public security forces and the BIRIs.
407
 Between June and 
October 1992, the UN intervened several times to revise the cease-fire timetable.
408
 The 
slow pace of the FMLN‘s demobilization prompted Boutros-Ghali to reschedule the 
target date from October 31 to December 15.
409
 Subsequently, former guerrillas began 
demobilizing and handing over weapons in greater numbers.
410
 The FMLN finished 
demobilization and became a political party on December 14. The next day, the 
Salvadoran civil war officially ended.  Approximately 75,000 Salvadorans had died.
411
  
The ad hoc commission‘s secret report to Cristiani led to a crisis in Salvadoran 
civil-military relations. Presented in late September 1992, the report recommended the 
removal of 102 officers (the names were never revealed publicly) including Ponce and 
the entire Tandona.
412
 Ponce denounced the ad hoc commission for not providing 
evidence of alleged illegal acts and the fact that officers could not appeal.
413
 Cristiani 
delayed the implementation of the commission‘s recommendations to prevent a possible 
coup. The deadline for depuración was December 15, 1992 but by January 1993, Ponce 
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and fourteen other officers remained.
414
 Despite pressure from the William J. Clinton 
administration and the UN, Cristiani did not finish the purge until the summer of 1993.  
The Salvadoran government‘s response to the release of the Truth Commission‘s 
report undermined key aspects of the peace agreement. Released on March 15, 1993, 
From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on 
the Truth for El Salvador examined patterns of violence and 32 cases of serious acts of 
violence since 1980.  The Truth Commission collected 22,000 complaints and attributed 
85 percent of the complaints to the armed forces and security forces, 10 percent to the 
death squads, and 5 percent to the FMLN.
415
 Furthermore, the Commission 
recommended the removal of dozens of military officers and civil servants including the 
entire Supreme Court. To placate an already hostile group of FAES officers led by 
Ponce, Cristiani pushed for a general and absolute amnesty law. On March 20, the 
Legislative Assembly passed a law granting amnesty to all Salvadorans accused of 
human rights violations committed during the civil war including the Jesuit murders.
416
 
Benavides and Mendoza were released from prison on April 1 after serving less two 
years of their thirty year sentences.
417
 Ponce retired on July 1 and became executive 
director of a Salvadoran telephone company; several officers retired in the US.
418
  
Despite nearly two years of negotiations over armed forces and human rights issues, 
military impunity remained the last vestige of the protection racket state.  
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The Bush administration facilitated the end of the Salvadoran civil war by urging 
continuous negotiations and encouraging all sides to accept compromises. After nearly 
ten years and billions of dollars of economic and military aid, the US embraced a 
political solution in January 1990. During the transition from the Cold War to the post-
Cold War era, the time had come for the Salvadoran civil war to end. However, the Bush 
administration could not abandon the Salvadoran government and military during the 
peace process. As a result, the administration had to battle Congress over its dual 
commitment to a negotiated political settlement and El Salvador‘s security.  
After the September 15, 1990 target date for a cease-fire passed, the Bush 
administration became more involved in the peace process. Working with the UN, 
Soviet Union and the Group of Friends, the administration pressured the Salvadoran 
government and the FMLN to negotiate in good faith. The administration pushed for 
continuous negotiations because it feared that leftist or rightist extremists could wreck 
the peace process and prolong the war for years. In contrast to the Reagan 
administration, the Bush administration was willing to directly contact the FMLN. As 
the December 31, 1991 deadline approached, the administration increased the pressure 
on all sides to reach a comprehensive peace agreement. The Chapultepec Accords, the 
product of nearly two years of UN-mediated negotiations, transformed Salvadoran 
society. The institutional autonomy of the FAES, the source of the resistance to the 
investigation and prosecution of the Jesuit case, had ended.  The Cold War was over and 
Central America was once again marginally important to US foreign policy.  
114 
 
El Salvador in 2010 is a working democracy. The military no longer wields the 
power it had for 60 years, the economy has grown and diversified, and poverty has been 
somewhat reduced. However, the country faces a widespread gang threat. The FMLN 
won the presidency in 2009, ending twenty years of ARENA control. Almost twenty 
years after the end of the civil war, El Salvador is still recovering.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 At the start of the George H. W. Bush administration, El Salvador had 
disappeared from the foreign policy agenda. The administration had more pressing 
priorities, most importantly, the state of relations with the Soviet Union. However, El 
Salvador reemerged as a divisive foreign policy issue in November 1989. Two days after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the FMLN, launched its largest military offensive of the war 
in San Salvador. On November 16, the FAES, used the guerilla offensive as an 
opportunity to murder six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter in cold 
blood. The murders were covered up and blamed on the guerrillas. These two events 
demonstrated the failure of US Cold War policy in El Salvador. Despite receiving more 
than $1 billion in US military assistance over a period of nearly ten years, the FAES 
could not defeat the FMLN. By murdering the Jesuits, the FAES had betrayed years of 
diplomatic initiatives and training by US military advisors to respect democracy and 
human rights. The Salvadoran civil war had stalemated, promoting both the government 
and guerrillas to seek the auspices of the United Nations to end the war with a negotiated 
political settlement.  
 During the transition to the post-Cold War era, the Bush administration viewed 
El Salvador as a burden of the Cold War. Despite attempts to avoid a debate in Congress 
over El Salvador, the Bush administration had to defend an unpopular policy. To remove 
the burden from its foreign policy agenda, the Bush administration fundamentally 
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changed US policy toward El Salvador. The administration carried out a private 
campaign involving nearly every major administration official, the US Embassy, and 
SOUTHCOM to pressure the FAES to investigate the Jesuit case and bring the killers to 
justice. Although the administration sought to prevent Congress from cutting US aid, 
frustration with the obstructionism of the FAES provoked the administration to secretly 
condition the release of military aid on progress in the Jesuit case. The Bush 
administration changed the objective of the El Salvador policy from military victory to a 
political solution. In contrast to the Reagan administration‘s hostility toward peace 
negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN and third party 
involvement, the Bush administration fully supported the nearly two year-long peace 
process mediated by the UN. Although the administration preferred a comprehensive 
peace agreement to be signed much earlier than January 16, 1992, it did facilitate 
negotiations by working with the UN, the Group of Friends of the Secretary for El 
Salvador, and the Soviet Union to encourage all sides to accept compromises. Just as 
important, the administration accepted the presence of the FMLN, which transitioned 
from an insurgency to a political party, in post-war Salvadoran society. When the 
Chapultepec Accords were signed on January 16, 1992, the Bush administration 
promptly lost interest in El Salvador.  
This thesis contributes to the histories of the Bush administration‘s foreign policy 
at the end of the Cold War and US-Latin American relations. Implementing a post-Cold 
War policy toward El Salvador demonstrated the pragmatism and prudence that defined 
the Bush administration‘s foreign policy. Despite the realist orientation of Bush‘s 
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foreign policy advisors, they recognized, albeit gradually, that lecturing the Salvadoran 
government and military about human rights and withholding military aid was crucial to 
resolving the Jesuit case.  Rather than continue advocating a military solution after 
November 1989, the administration accepted that domestic and international factors 
pointed toward a negotiated political settlement. Although the administration supported 
the peace process, it did not fully understand the role of the UN as mediator. The 
administration‘s constant insistence on a peace agreement as soon as possible, regardless 
of the status of negotiations, placed unnecessary pressure on Alvaro de Soto.  
The Bush administration‘s efforts to remove El Salvador from its foreign policy 
agenda demonstrate that in the absence of a pressing security threat, American foreign 
policymakers have marginal interest in Latin America. The overwhelming fear of Soviet 
and Cuban expansionism in Central America greatly influenced US policy toward El 
Salvador after 1979. When that perceived threat ended in 1990-1991, the Bush 
administration recognized that there was no need for the US to continue its anti-
communist crusade but instead help bring peace to the region. During the early 1980s, 
the Reagan administration argued that the fate of El Salvador would determine the global 
balance of power. Today, El Salvador is a working democracy of little strategic 
importance to American national interests.    
The Bush policy toward El Salvador is an anomaly in the history of US-Latin 
American relations. Rather than act unilaterally, the Bush administration encouraged a 
multilateral approach to ending the Salvadoran civil war by supporting the participation 
of international institutions and third party countries. Unlike the Latin American policies 
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of previous administrations, the objective of Bush‘s El Salvador policy was to disengage 
the US from the domestic affairs of another country. To achieve this objective, however, 
the Bush administration had to directly intervene in Salvadoran political and military 
affairs by applying pressure on the FAES to end its obstructionism of the Jesuit case and 
on government negotiators to accept compromises during the peace process.   
The history of the Bush administration‘s El Salvador policy remains incomplete. 
Many documents related to El Salvador at the George Bush Presidential Library remain 
classified while those currently available for researchers contain redacted sections. When 
scholars have complete access to these records, they will fully understand how the Bush 
administration removed the burden of El Salvador.  
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